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Abstract 
An Analysis of the Impacts of China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
on African Pangolin Conservation 
Brittany Ann Horton, MGPS 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2020 
Supervisor:  Joshua W. Busby
The purpose of this study is to assess the impact of China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative on conservation of African pangolins, four species of scaly anteater endemic to 
Sub-Saharan Africa. This report is composed of four chapters: Chapter One introduces 
essential information about pangolin conservation and China’s engagement with Africa 
through the Belt and Road Initiative. Chapters Two and Three review demand for 
pangolins and the pangolin trafficking supply chain. Chapter Four concludes the study, 
offers key takeaways from the study and policy recommendations for the United States 
Government and China to engage with pangolin conservation. 
Pangolins are in demand for their scales, which are used in Traditional Chinese 
Medicine, and their meat, which is consumed in restaurants across China and Vietnam. 
The Belt and Road Initiative has served as a tool for China to promote the use of 
Traditional Chinese Medicine, through construction of TCM Centers and pharmaceutical 
exports. This is unlikely to slow down and as BRI grows, additional demand pressure will 
be placed on pangolins, which are sourced primarily from Africa. The pangolin 
trafficking supply chain shows Nigeria as the primary origin country, Singapore as the 
top transit country, and Vietnam as the main demand country (with China following) 
from 2016-2019. Analysis of Nigeria’s role in international pangolin trafficking, as the 
top country between 2016-2019 suggests that BRI is a contributing factor to pangolin 
trafficking but cannot be separated out as its own driver of pangolin loss.  
This study serves as an at-a-glance report on the nature of BRI and pangolin 
conservation. It was hindered by a range of data limitations, which plague the conservation 
vi 
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community as a whole. Although from a scientific perspective it would be pertinent to 
repeat this study in several years with better data once BRI has gained a stronger foothold, 
pangolins do not have the luxury of time.  
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Chapter One: Introduction to the Issue 
Pangolins, the world’s only truly scaly mammals,1 are a family of eight species of scaly 
anteater endemic to Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 1). Although pangolins have been 
utilized in traditional medicines across their range for centuries, in the last decade exploitation has 
skyrocketed to levels that are unsustainable both for pangolin populations and the humans utilizing 
pangolin products. An estimated one million pangolins were poached from 2000-2013,2 trafficked 
along illicit trade routes, and sold as medicines and delicacies in East and Southeast Asia, most 
notably in China and Vietnam. The total number of pangolins remaining in the wild is uncertain, 
as population studies are inconclusive.3 However, the substantial number of pangolins seized by 
law enforcement suggests high pressure on the planet’s remaining wild pangolins. 
 
 
Figure 1. Scales comprise one-third of pangolins’ body weight4 and are the primary cause 
of global pangolin exploitation.5 Image courtesy of World Wildlife Fund. 
 
 
1 Challender, Daniel W. S., Carly Waterman, and Jonathan E. M. Baillie. “Scaling Up Pangolin Conservation: IUCN 
SSC Pangolin Specialist Group Conservation Action Plan.” London, United Kingdom: Zoological Society 
of London, 2014. https://www.iucn.org/downloads/scaling_up_pangolin_conservation_280714_v4_1.pdf.  
2 Heinrich, Sarah, Talia Wittman, Joshua Ross, Chris Shepherd, Daniel Challender, and Phillip Cassey. “The Global 
Trafficking of Pangolins: A Comprehensive Summary of Seizures and Trafficking Routes from 2010 - 2015.” 
Selangor, Malaysia: TRAFFIC, 2017. https://www.traffic.org/publications/reports/the-global-trafficking-of-
pangolins/.  
3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Wildlife Crime: Pangolin Scales.” United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2020. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/wildlife.html.  
4 MacDonald, James. “The Pangolin Extinction Vortex.” JSTOR Daily, March 15, 2019. https://daily.jstor.org/the-
pangolin-extinction-vortex/.   
5 World Wildlife Fund. “Species: Pangolin.” World Wildlife Fund, n.d.  
https://www.worldwildlife.org/species/pangolin. 
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Pangolins have risen from relative obscurity to earn global attention with the moniker of 
“the world’s most trafficked non-human mammal.” The four Asian species were the initial target 
of traffickers’ attention, but in recent years a shift occurred in pangolin trafficking. Asian species 
became progressively more difficult to find and traffickers set their sights on African species. Most 
recently, pangolins became part of the global public health conversation as they were identified as 
a possible intermediate host of SARS-CoV-2. This potential connection and its subsequent media 
attention have awareness of this animal for many around the world who were previously unfamiliar 
with the pangolin and its conservation. 
While pangolin trafficking was on the rise,  China was also shifting its attention to the 
African continent. On September 7, 2013, President Xi Jinping of China announced the creation 
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in his speech “Promote People-to-People Friendship and 
Create a Better Future.” After initially focusing BRI’s two main components – the Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road – on Asia, the ties between China and 
Africa have strengthened through Chinese financial investment and infrastructure across the 
African continent. One key component of China’s extension of friendship to the world is through 
the promotion of Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM), which uses pangolin scales in select 
remedies and is the most influential driver of pangolin trafficking. 
Today, the most substantial pangolin trafficking occurs via transnational crime 
organizations along well-established routes from source countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. 
Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Cameroon) to destination countries (i.e. China 
and Vietnam). Pangolin trafficking on a small scale also occurs in Africa and Asia, however the 
immense shipment sizes trafficked by transnational crime organizations presents a more 
substantial threat to pangolin conservation and is the focus of conservationists’ attention and 
intervention resources. Wildlife crime as a global illicit enterprise has security, public health, and 
governance implications for countries at every step of these trafficking routes, creating 
international consequences for the trafficking of this mammal and making pangolins the poster 
child for a multi-billion-dollar global wildlife crime industry. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on 
conservation of African pangolins. Within this report, there are four chapters. Chapter One is an 
introduction to the problem, with background on wildlife crime, pangolin trafficking, and China’s 
relationship with Africa historically and in the context of BRI. Chapters Two and Three focus on 
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demand and supply, respectively. Both chapters begin with an introduction to this issue from 
existing literature, then an analysis of the role BRI has played on demand and supply of pangolins. 
Chapter Four highlights the sizeable need for additional research to fill key data gaps and provides 
policy recommendations for the United States and People’s Republic of China based on each 
nation’s vested interests in addressing pangolin conservation in light of their larger foreign policy 
aims. 
PART ONE: WILDLIFE CRIME AND PANGOLINS 
The purpose of this section is to provide important context around the issue of pangolin 
trafficking as explored in this report. First, it begins with information on wildlife crime as a global 
illicit economy, with emphasis on attempts at global regulation and the scope of pangolin 
trafficking. Next, it introduces pangolins, explaining key aspects of their natural history, including 
the conservation community’s limited knowledge about pangolin biology, population, and 
behavior. Each of the concepts introduced here are foundational to the subsequent chapters in this 
report.  
Wildlife Crime 
Scale and Consequences 
Wildlife crime, defined by INTERPOL as “criminal activity resulting in the illegal 
exploitation of wild flora and fauna”6 is the largest component of environmental crime, which 
includes illicit activity in the wildlife, forestry, mineral resources, and fisheries sectors. 
Environmental crime is considered the fourth largest global illicit economy, behind narcotic, 
weapon, and human trafficking.7 Attempts to estimate the total annual value of environmental and 
wildlife crime are varied due to difficulty in quantifying the full scale of the industry. However, in 
a joint report from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and INTERPOL, 
environmental crime has an estimated annual value of $91-258 billion annually, with wildlife 
 
6 INTERPOL. “Global Wildlife Enforcement: Strengthening Law Enforcement Cooperation Against Wildlife Crime.” 
INTERPOL, March 2019. 
7 Utermohlen, Mary, and Patrick Baine. “In Plane Sight: Wildlife Trafficking in the Air Transport Sector.” ROUTES, 
2018. https://www.traffic.org/publications/reports/in-plane-sight/.  
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crime yielding an estimated $7-23 billion annually in revenue for transnational criminal 
organizations engaged in the industry.8 
INTERPOL uses the term “wildlife crime” to describe not only wildlife poaching and 
trafficking, but its associated illicit activity. This includes document fraud, corruption, money 
laundering, and tax evasion.9 
The most direct consequence of wildlife crime is the depletion of wildlife species and 
environmental destruction, either directly through deforestation and poaching action or indirectly 
through the removal of a species from their ecosystem. Wildlife crime as a practice has a highly 
adverse impact on biodiversity and ecosystem services provided by wildlife species. Exploitation 
of wildlife and close contact between wildlife and people can lead to risks for human security and 
global public health, evident of late in the zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2, where pangolins 
were purported to be the intermediate carrier of the virus between bats and humans.10 Wildlife 
crime also leads to social and governance challenges including increased corruption, trafficking of 
weapons and drugs, lost government income, declines in tourism, and reduced economic 
development. There is also a linkage between wildlife crime and international security, though the 
nexus between militant activity and wildlife trafficking is a small subset of the larger swath of 
maladies associated with wildlife crime activity.11 
Key Actors and the Wildlife Trafficking Supply Chain 
Wildlife crime is not a uniform endeavor. Key actors involved in the trade encompass the 
full wildlife crime supply chain, but also range from opportunistic travelers to transnational 
criminal organizations. For the focus of this report, the emphasis is on industrial scale wildlife 
crime engaged in by transnational crime organizations. The United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime defines organized criminal groups, such as those involved in 
 
8 Nellemann, C., R Henricksen, A. Kreilhuber, D. Stewart, M. Kotsovou, P. Raxter, E. Mrema, and S. Barrat. “The 
Rise of Environmental Crime - A Growing Threat to Natural Resources, Peace, Development and Security.” 
UNEP INTERPOL, 2016. 
9 INTERPOL. “Global Wildlife Enforcement: Strengthening Law Enforcement Cooperation Against Wildlife Crime.”  
INTERPOL, March 2019. 
10 Lam, Tommy Tsan-Yuk, Na Jia, Ya-Wei Zhang, Marcus Ho-Hin Shum, Jia-Fu Jiang, Hua-Chen Zhu, Yi-Gang 
Tong, et al. “Identifying SARS-CoV-2-Related Coronaviruses in Malayan Pangolins.” Nature, 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41566-020-2169-0.  
11 Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “Wildlife and Drug Trafficking, Terrorism, and Human Security.” The Brookings 
Institution, November 8, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/wildlife-and-drug-trafficking-terrorism-
and-human-security/.  
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wildlife crime, as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and 
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses established in 
accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other 
material benefit.”12 
Although wildlife crime can be considered a low-risk, high-reward endeavor,13 the 
complex supply chain requires a certain level of organizational structure which lends itself to the 
ability of an organization to harvest wildlife in biodiversity-rich regions, primarily Africa, 
Southeast Asia, and Latin America,14 and smuggle product into destination countries with high 
demand for wildlife, typically Southeast and East Asia. Operating as complex transnational 
businesses, these networks are responsible for tasks including matching demand with supply, 
stockpiling goods, shipping product across regions and continents, transferring (and in many cases, 
laundering) money between countries, and maintaining control over actors at all levels of the 
supply chain.15 
A sample wildlife trafficking supply chain is as follows: 1) Wildlife are harvested in range 
states; 2) Collected wildlife and their products are transported to a consolidation location where 
they are concealed with other commodities and prepared for shipment; 3) A shipment container, 
mixed with legal commodities and illegal wildlife products, is packed, the carrier issues a Bill of 
Lading, and the container is moved to port and loaded onto a ship for transcontinental transport; 
4) In transit and at various ports, the Bill of Lading may be altered or the container may be moved 
onto a different ship; 5) When it reaches the arrival destination, the container is emptied and 
wildlife products are moved to a safe location; 6) Wildlife products are smuggled into destination 
countries, processed, and sold – legally or illegally – in domestic or international markets.16 
 
12 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “World Wildlife Crime Report: Trafficking in Protected Species.”   
Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/wildlife.html.  
13 TRAFFIC. “Combating Wildlife Crime Linked to the Internet.” Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2019. 
https://www.traffic.org/publications/reports/combating-wildlife-crime-linked-to-the-internet/.  
14 Esmail, Nafeesa, Lauren Harrington, Jack Lam, Kelly Malsch, E.J. Milner-Gulland, Zara Bending, Michael t’ Sas 
Rolfes, and Carole White. “Horizon Scanning for Illegal Wildlife Trade: A Strategic Approach to Inform 
Future CITES Policy Decisions.” Policy Briefing. Oxford Martin Programme on the Illegal Wildlife Trade, 
August 16, 2019. https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/publications/cites-briefing-2019/.  
15 Costa, Jacopo. “Preliminary Report: Examining Wildlife Trafficking Networks in East Africa Through the Lens of  
Social Network Analysis.” Basel Institute on Governance, December 2019. 
https://www.baselgovernance.org/publications/preliminary-report-examining-wildlife-trafficking-networks-
east-africa-through-lens.  
16 Prinsloo, Hendelene. “Scaling Up: The Rapid Growth in the Industrial Scale Trafficking of Pangolin Scales.  
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In the early 2010s, terrorist organizations including Al-Shabaab, the Lord’s Resistance 
Army, and the Janjaweed were commonly implicated in wildlife trafficking activity due to their 
nature as transnational crime groups, often with a defined organizational structure, access to 
weaponry, and capacity to engage in money laundering and other financial crimes. A 2013 ODNI 
report on wildlife poaching, specifically of rhinoceros and elephant, suggested that “criminal 
elements of all kinds, including some terrorist entities and rogue military officers, are becoming 
involved in countries across east, central, and southern Africa.”17 Contrary to this analysis, in 2014 
Daniel Stiles determined that there is not a credible linkage between Al-Shabaab and ivory 
trafficking, but that the LRA and Janjaweed extensively poach and traffic ivory, but are not an 
immediate security threat to the United States.18 This assertion is echoed by Vanda Felbab-Brown, 
who suggests that “analyses of the wildlife-trafficking-militancy-nexus are often shrouded in 
unproven assumptions and myths” that don’t address underlying issues, such as the fact that 
militant groups play a limited role in the overall global wildlife trafficking picture.19 Although the 
structure of militant groups is conducive to trafficking of illicit goods, wildlife trafficking and 
militancy are not strongly correlated. 
Regulation and Enforcement 
Large-scale wildlife crime in its current state is an international operation. However, 
enforcement of wildlife crime is hampered by the lack of any international convention defining 
wildlife crime. 
The primary mechanism for international wildlife protection is the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which has dictated 
the criteria for legal international trade in wildlife and plants since it came into force in 1975. As 
 
Wildlife Justice Commission, 2020. https://wildlifejustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/The_Rapid_Growth_in_the_Trafficking_of_Pangolin_Scales_2015-2019.pdf.  
17 Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Wildlife Poaching Threatens Economic, Security Priorities in 
Africa.” ODNI, September 6, 2013. 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Wildlife_Poaching_White_Paper_2013.pdf.  
18 Stiles, Daniel. “Ivory Trade, Terrorism and U.S. National Security: How Connected Are They?,” 2014. 
http://danstiles.org/publications/ivory/42.Ivory&National%20Security.pdf.  
19 Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “Wildlife and Drug Trafficking, Terrorism, and Human Security.” The Brookings 
Institution, November 8, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/wildlife-and-drug-trafficking-terrorism-
and-human-security/.  
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a result, CITES sets the rules around wildlife trade that transnational crime organizations subvert 
when engaging in trafficking activity.20 
Today, 183 member states are Parties to the Convention, aiming to protect approximately 
37,000 species or plants and animals.21 CITES regulates wildlife trade through assessments of a 
species’ risk of extinction from trade, listing species on one of three Appendices to reflect risk 
level. Appendix I is the most stringent level of monitoring. If a species is listed on Appendix I, 
legal international trade of that species is prohibited and “permitted only in exceptional 
circumstances,” with import and export permits required in the event a specimen is traded.22 
Appendix II allows CITES to monitor species that are not currently threatened with extinction as 
a result of international trade, but may be in the future. For Appendix II species, export permits 
are required, while import permits are not required unless otherwise mandated by national law. 
Appendix III is the least stringent level of international regulation, where species are protected 
domestically by one or more Parties. In this case, CITES acts as a mechanism for Parties to 
collaborate multilaterally to regulate trade in listed species between themselves. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) describes wildlife crime as 
“harvesting and trade contrary to national law,”23 with the national laws in question being those 
which CITES Member Parties must enact domestically to provide the enforcement ‘teeth’ to 
CITES. In the United States, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and its subsequent amendments 
provide this function. In China, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of 
Wildlife (1988) aims to protect threatened species.24  
CITES is not without its limitations. Critics of CITES point to the rare “downlisting” of 
species, where conservation successes lead CITES Member Parties to move a species from 
Appendix I protections to the less stringent Appendix II. This is partly due to CITES role in 
regulating trade, rather than as a holistic international effort at wildlife protection. CITES protects 
 
20 CITES. “Full text.” CITES, n.d. https://cites.org/eng/disc/text.php.  
21 CITES. “What is CITES?” CITES, n.d. https://cites.org/eng/disc/what.php. 
22 CITES. “How CITES Works.” CITES, n.d. https://cites.org/eng/disc/how.php.   
23 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “World Wildlife Crime Report: Trafficking in Protected Species.” 
Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/wildlife.html.  
24 The People’s Republic of China. “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Wildlife” [translated  





species in terms of trade risk only, which is just one driver of global biodiversity loss. Climate 
change, disease, habitat loss and degradation, invasive alien species, and many other drivers are 
placing pressure on wildlife species, and CITES is unable to answer this challenge through 
addressing international trade. Also, as a body comprising nation states with voting power and 
conservation NGOs with observer status, CITES is not exempt from political motivations in listing 
decisions. On occasion, conservation is limited by politics as the CITES Secretariat has limited 
power to keep Parties in alignment with the larger conservation goals and mechanisms of the 
Convention. Most importantly, Parties are required to implement domestic legislation in 
compliance with CITES, but there is little recourse for the Secretariat to act if countries do not 
pass conservation regulations at home or if enforcement capacity renders CITES ineffective on 
their borders. An additional enforcement challenge arises when different nations have disparate 
wildlife regulations, as is the case with pangolins, where what is legal domestically in one country 
may not be legal in another.25 Lastly, sometimes listing can simply come too late, either due to the 
political nature of the discourse or large number of drivers impacting its conservation. CITES is 
not perfect, but it’s the most influential framework on the table today. 
Species Caught in the Trade 
Wildlife crime impacts species of every taxa, from mammals to birds to reptiles to fish to 
insects.26 Whether for TCM, tourist trinkets, or the global pet trade, wildlife crime has significant 
impacts on the conservation of species on every continent, except Antarctica. The more 
charismatic megafauna – rhinoceros, elephant, tiger, and pangolin – comprise the majority of 
illegal wildlife trade and take up most of the oxygen in terms of global advocacy and enforcement 
attention. 
When analyzing wildlife crime as a global phenomenon, it is important to not make 
generalizations when interpreting drivers of species loss across multiple species. While the rate of 
 
25 The People’s Republic of China. “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Wildlife” [translated   




26Actman, Jani. “Bug Smuggling Is Big Business.” National Geographic, September 5, 2019.  
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/2019/09/bug-smuggling-big-business/.  
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species extinction is nearly 1,000 times the historical average,27 the mechanisms of wildlife crime 
and exploitation are not uniform. Rather, each species of wildlife engulfed in wildlife crime has 
unique drivers of loss and when combined with other species, can be thought of as a group of 
distinct but related illicit markets.28 Although pangolin trafficking shares similar characteristics to 
the markets for elephant or rhinoceros, pangolins have their own unique natural history, ranges, 
and place within the wildlife crime picture. 
The Pangolin Conservation Picture 
Natural History 
Despite their prominent role in the conversation on wildlife crime, the global conservation 
community knows relatively little about pangolins. Pangolins are at risk of disappearing before 
many in the West learn of their existence and before the scientific community is able to unravel 
some of the mysteries about their natural history.  
Pangolins serve an integral role in their ecosystem and are referred to as “ecosystem 
engineers.”29 As insectivores, an adult pangolin can consume a diet of approximately 70 million 
ants and termites every year,30 providing a regulatory function for insect populations and 
maintaining the health of forest ecosystems. They utilize their long claws on their forelimbs to dig 
burrows to nest and sleep, which also provide essential habitat for other species of wildlife after 
pangolins have departed the area. 
Pangolins are best known for their scales, made of compressed hair and primarily 
composed of keratin. A single animal can have over 1,000 continually growing scales on its body.31 
Scales are invaluable to pangolins when faced with a predator, as they roll into a tight ball in order 
 
27 Felbab-Brown, Vanda, and Bradley S. Porter. “The Global Poaching Vortex.” The Brookings Institution, March 2, 
2016. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/03/02/the-global-poaching-vortex/. 
28 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “World Wildlife Crime Report: Trafficking in Protected Species.” 
Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/wildlife.html. 
29 United States Fish and Wildlife Service International Affairs. “Pangolins.” United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 
International Affairs, n.d. https://www.fws.gov/international/animals/pangolins.html. 
30 Ibid. 
31 MacDonald, James. “The Pangolin Extinction Vortex.” JSTOR Daily, March 15, 2019. https://daily.jstor.org/the-
pangolin-extinction-vortex/. 
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to protect themselves against a lion or leopard (Figure 2). However, this instinctive protection 
mechanism makes them easy targets for poachers, who can simply reach down and pick them up. 
 
 
Figure 2. Pangolins’ natural defense works against them when confronted by poachers. 
Image courtesy of Save Pangolins.32 
 
 Unfortunately for conservationists, poachers, and pangolins alike, pangolins are becoming 
more difficult to find.33 Our knowledge of pangolin exploitation comes primarily from anecdotal 
information and trafficking analyses rather than population studies, with population measurements 
being the conservation community’s preferred method of determining the species health. 
Pangolins’ nocturnal and solitary behavior, and lack of any unique physical markings,34 presents 
a challenge for monitoring and population surveys. To date, no comprehensive pangolin 
population estimates exist.35 However, in 2014, all eight pangolin species were listed on the IUCN 
Red List of Threatened Species as threatened with extinction.36 Listing is typically based on 
 
32 Save Pangolins. “What is a pangolin?” Save Pangolins, n.d. https://www.savepangolins.org/what-is-a-pangolin.  
33 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Wildlife Crime: Pangolin Scales.” United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, 2020. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/wildlife.html.  
34 Willcox, Daniel, Helen Nash, Scott Trageser, Hyeon Jeong Kim, Lisa Hywood, Ellen Connelly, Godwill Ichu Ichu, 
et al. “Evaluating Methods for Detecting and Monitoring Pangolin (Pholidota: Manidae) Populations.” 
Global Ecology and Conservation 17 (January 20, 2019): 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gecco.2019.e00539.  
35 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “World Wildlife Crime Report: Trafficking in Protected Species.” 
Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/wildlife.html.  
36 International Union for the Conservation of Nature SSC Pangolin Specialist Group. “The Status, Trade and 
Conservation of Pangolins (Manis Spp.).” Information Document for the 17th Meeting of the Conference of 
Parties to CITES. Johannesburg, South Africa, 2016. 
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population assessment, but in the case of highly trafficked species like pangolins, an estimation of 
high exploitation can lead to a listing change and bring increased awareness associated with listing 
action. Conservationists believe that due to high levels of pangolin trafficking, coupled with slow 
pangolin reproductive rates,37 that all eight species are in decline. Without population data, 
however, the exact numerical impact of these factors on pangolin conservation is unknown.38 
 Outside of trafficking pressure, pangolins are also facing challenges of habitat loss. 
Deforestation in Central Africa is directly impacting three species of pangolin, resulting in habitat 
degradation, increased difficulty to find food, and higher poaching pressure as humans are brought 
into closer contact with pangolins.39 In Southern Africa, land management practices, specifically 
installation of electric fences, lead to pangolin fatalities.40 
Asian Pangolins 
Four pangolin species are endemic to Asia (Figure 3): the Chinese pangolin (Manis 
pentadactyla), Philippine pangolin (M. culionensis), Sunda pangolin (M. javanica), and Indian 
pangolin (M. crassicaudata). As of the most recent assessments in 2018-2019, the Chinese 
pangolin, Philippine pangolin, and Sunda pangolin are all listed as Critically Endangered on the 
IUCN Red List, while the Indian pangolin is listed as Endangered. 
 
 
37 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “World Wildlife Crime Report: Trafficking in Protected Species.” 
Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/wildlife.html.  
38 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Wildlife Crime: Pangolin Scales.” United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, 2020. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/wildlife.html.  
39 Prinsloo, Hendelene. “Scaling Up: The Rapid Growth in the Industrial Scale Trafficking of Pangolin Scales.” 
Wildlife Justice Commission, 2020. https://wildlifejustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/The_Rapid_Growth_in_the_Trafficking_of_Pangolin_Scales_2015-2019.pdf.  
40 Challender, Daniel W. S., Carly Waterman, and Jonathan E. M. Baillie. “Scaling Up Pangolin Conservation: IUCN 
SSC Pangolin Specialist Group Conservation Action Plan.” London, United Kingdom: Zoological Society 




Figure 3. Ranges of Asian pangolin species. (Top Left) Chinese pangolin are extant in 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Hong Kong, India, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, Taiwan, Thailand, 
and Vietnam, and are found in forest, shrubland, and grassland habitats.41 (Top Right) Philippine 
pangolin are extant in the Philippines and are found in forest and shrubland habitats.42 (Bottom 
Left) Sunda pangolin are extant in Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam and possibly in China, and are found in 
forest and shrubland habitats.43 (Bottom Right) Indian pangolin are extant to Bangladesh, India, 
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka and found in forest, savanna, shrubland, and grassland habitats.44 
 
41 Challender, D., Wu, S., Kaspal, P., Khatiwada, A., Ghose, A., Ching-Min Sun, N., Mohapatra, R.K. & Laxmi  
Suwal, T. 2019. Manis pentadactyla (errata version published in 2020). The IUCN Red List of Threatened 
Species 2019:e.T12764A168392151. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12764A168392151.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020.; Image from Pangolins text page 54. 
42 Schoppe, S., Katsis, L. & Lagrada, L. 2019. Manis culionensis. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2019:  
e.T136497A123586862. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T136497A123586862.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins text page 114. 
43 Challender, D., Willcox, D.H.A., Panjang, E., Lim, N., Nash, H., Heinrich, S. & Chong, J. 2019. Manis  
javanica. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2019: 
e.T12763A123584856. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12763A123584856.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins text page 94. 
44 Mahmood, T., Challender, D., Khatiwada, A., Andleeb, S., Perera, P., Trageser, S., Ghose, A. & Mohapatra,  
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African Pangolins 
The other four pangolin species are endemic to Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 4): the white-
bellied pangolin (Phataginus tricuspis), black-bellied pangolin (P. tetradactyla), giant ground 
pangolin (Smutsia gigantea), and Temminck’s pangolin/ground pangolin (S. temminckii). Similar 
to the Asian pangolin species, all four species’ populations are considered to be in decline, 
although fewer population data are available for African pangolins than their Asian counterparts.45 
As of the most recent assessments in May 2019, the white-bellied pangolin and giant ground 
pangolin are listed as Endangered and the black-bellied pangolin and Temminck’s pangolin are 




Figure 4. Ranges of African pangolin species. 
 
R. 2019. Manis crassicaudata. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2019: 
e.T12761A123583998. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12761A123583998.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins text page 76. 
45 International Union for the Conservation of Nature SSC Pangolin Specialist Group. “The Status, Trade and 
Conservation of Pangolins (Manis Spp.).” Information Document for the 17th Meeting of the Conference of 
Parties to CITES. Johannesburg, South Africa, 2016. 
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Figure 4. Ranges of African Pangolin Species. (Top Left) White-bellied pangolin are extant in 
Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
and Zambia, and are found in forest and savanna habitats.46 (Top Right) Black-bellied pangolin 
are extant in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, and are 
possibly extant in Angola and Uganda. This species is found in forest and savanna habitats.47 
(Bottom Left) Giant ground pangolin are extant in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda and are possibly extant in Benin, Burkina Faso, Kenya, and Niger. They are found in 
forest and savanna habitats.48 (Bottom Right) Temminck’s pangolin are extant in Angola, 
Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe, possibly extant in Democratic Republic of Congo, and possibly extinct in Eswatini. 
They are found in forest, savanna, and grassland habitats.49 
Attempts to Protect Pangolins 
With pangolins ranging across Asia and Africa, conservation of the eight pangolin species 
is an inherently international undertaking. In 2000 CITES Parties adopted a zero-export quota for 
wild-caught Asian pangolins, as Asian species were the primary product of commercial pangolin 
trade at the time. Asian pangolins dominated the legal market until around 2014, when trade of 
African species increased sharply. From 2013 to 2017, legal imports of African pangolins went 
from almost zero to approximately 13 tons.50 These shipments originated in Burundi, Democratic 
 
46 Pietersen, D., Moumbolou, C., Ingram, D.J., Soewu, D., Jansen, R., Sodeinde, O., Keboy Mov Linkey Iflankoy, C.,  
Challender, D. & Shirley, M.H. 2019. Phataginus tricuspis. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2019: 
e.T12767A123586469. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12767A123586469.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins text page 146. 
47 Ingram, D.J., Shirley, M.H., Pietersen, D., Godwill Ichu, I., Sodeinde, O., Moumbolou, C., Hoffmann, M., Gudehus, 
M. & Challender, D. 2019. Phataginus tetradactyla. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2019: 
e.T12766A123586126. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12766A123586126.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins text page 129. 
48 Nixon, S., Pietersen, D., Challender, D., Hoffmann, M., Godwill Ichu, I., Bruce, T., Ingram, D.J., Matthews, N. &  
Shirley, M.H. 2019. Smutsia gigantea. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2019: 
e.T12762A123584478. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12762A123584478.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins text page 162. 
49 Pietersen, D., Jansen, R. & Connelly, E. 2019. Smutsia temminckii. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2019:  
e.T12765A123585768. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12765A123585768.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins text page 181. 
50 UNODC, 2020 – Wildlife crime, pangolin scales report United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Wildlife  
Crime: Pangolin Scales.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020. 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/wildlife.html.  
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Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo, and Uganda, and 99% of these shipments were 
imported into China.51 CITES Member Parties responded to this shift by listing all eight species 
of pangolins on Appendix I, which went into effect in January 2017.  
As for pangolin range states, by May 2020 only 17 countries had legislation to protect 
pangolins that meets CITES requirements and the other 31 countries had not.52 According to the 
IUCN SSC Pangolin Specialist Group, pangolin trade is a conservation concern in Angola, Benin, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, and Uganda.53 
For each African species, protection across their range is variable, with some countries offering 
full protection, others only partial, and several – including the Central African Republic, Congo, 
Gabon, Kenya, and Liberia not offering any protection for their endemic pangolins.54 
In China, pangolins are partially protected under the Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on the Protection of Wildlife, also referred to as China’s Wildlife Protection Law. The law was 
adopted on 8 November 1988, and was “formulated for the purpose of protecting and saving the 
species of wildlife which are rare or near extinction, protecting, developing and rationally utilizing 
wildlife resources and maintaining ecological balances.”55 Under the Wildlife Protection Law, 
“wildlife resources shall be owned by the state” which requires “citizens of the People’s Republic 
of China [to] have the duty to protect wildlife resources and the right to inform the authorities of 
or file charges against … destruction of wildlife resources.”56 Wildlife are listed as Class I or Class 
II species under the law, which similar to CITES Appendices provides differing levels of 
protection. The Chinese pangolin (M. pentadactyla) was listed as a Class II species and was the 
 
51 UNODC, 2020 – Wildlife crime, pangolin scales report United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Wildlife 
Crime: Pangolin Scales.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020. 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/wildlife.html.  
52 Guynup, Sharon. “Pangolins On the Brink as Africa-China Trafficking Persists Unabated.” Mongabay, May 8, 
2018. https://news.mongabay.com/2018/05/pangolins-on-the-brink-as-africa-china-trafficking-persists-
unabated/.  
53 International Union for the Conservation of Nature SSC Pangolin Specialist Group. “The Status, Trade and 
Conservation of Pangolins (Manis Spp.).” Information Document for the 17th Meeting of the Conference of 
Parties to CITES. Johannesburg, South Africa, 2016. 
54 Ibid. 
55 The People’s Republic of China. “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Wildlife” [translated  
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only pangolin species protected domestically in China, as it is the only pangolin species endemic 
to China.57 This listing provided incomplete protection for pangolins in two key ways: 1) It 
relegated protection to the provincial, rather than national, level,58 and 2) Exemptions for TCM 
use allowed for legal trade in pharmaceuticals containing pangolin products.59 On 5 June 2020, the 
Chinese State Forestry and Grassland Administration announced that pangolin protection would 
be strengthened as all eight pangolin species will now be considered Class I species, joining other 
charismatic protected species like the giant panda.60 As part of Class I protection, pangolin 
trafficking penalties should increase in severity and pangolin habitat should be protected. 
Enforcement is a key issue, which will reflect how serious China is about protecting pangolins. 
The primary loophole in this listing is that pangolin-based TCM products sourced from “officially 
approved government stockpiles” remain legal.61 This facilitates laundering of illegally-sourced 
pangolins, described in more detail in chapter 2. There is potential room for optimism, however. 
Quickly after the listing changed, the newly published 2020 edition of the Chinese 
Pharmacopoeia, which contains TCM remedies that rely on wildlife, partially omitted pangolins 
by removing pangolin scales as a raw material but keeping eight patented medicines which utilize 
pangolin as a key ingredient.62 Since TCM is a major driver of pangolin demand, and the resulting 
poaching and trafficking, removal of pangolins as a raw material in the pharmacopoeia is a positive 
first step for pangolins under domestic law in China – but it remains incomplete. According to 
Paul Thomson, Executive Director of the Save Pangolins NGO, “China’s move to phase out 
pangolin scales from traditional medicines could be the game changer we have been waiting for.”63 
 
57 State Forestry and Grassland Bureau Government Network. “List of National Key Protected Wild Animals” 
(translated to English). Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China, 14 January 
1989. http://www.forestry.gov.cn/main/3954/20180104/1063883.html. 
58 MacDonald, James. “The Pangolin Extinction Vortex.” JSTOR Daily, March 15, 2019. https://daily.jstor.org/the-
pangolin-extinction-vortex/.  
59 Prinsloo, Hendelene. “Scaling Up: The Rapid Growth in the Industrial Scale Trafficking of Pangolin Scales.” 
Wildlife Justice Commission, 2020. https://wildlifejustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/The_Rapid_Growth_in_the_Trafficking_of_Pangolin_Scales_2015-2019.pdf.  
60 No Author. “No More Medicine! Pangolin “Delisted” From Pharmacopoeia (translated to English). Health Times, 
9 June 2020. http://www.jksb.com.cn/html/xinwen/2020/0609/163148.html 
61 TRAFFIC. “China Moves to Give Full Protection to Native Pangolins.” Press Release. Wildlife Trade News from 
TRAFFIC, June 5, 2020. https://www.traffic.org/news/china-moves-to-give-full-protection-to-native-
pangolins/.  
62 Alberts, Elizabeth Claire. “Did China Really Ban the Pangolin Trade? Not Quite, Investors Say.” Mongabay. June  
24, 2020. https://news.mongabay.com/2020/06/did-china-really-ban-the-pangolin-trade-not-quite-
investigators-say/. 
63 Briggs, Helen. “Hope for Pangolins as Protection Boosted in China.” BBC News, June 10, 2020. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-52981804.  
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True protection for pangolins in China will ultimately require complete removal of pangolins from 
TCM remedies listed within the pharmacopoeia, closing the domestic TCM stockpile loophole, 
enforcing the Class I listing, and promoting demand reduction and public education strategies to 
discourage consumption of pangolin products. 
Second to China in terms of the scale of pangolin demand, Vietnam also provides 
protections for pangolins and other trafficked wildlife. In January 2018, Vietnam’s penal code was 
amended to permit up to 15 years in prison and fines of up to USD$660,000 for individuals and 
organizations involved in trafficking wildlife such as pangolins.64 Despite these consequences for 
trafficking, pangolin trafficking into Vietnam remains persistent.65 
Although the United States acknowledges that all eight pangolin species are experiencing 
population decline, only the Temminck’s pangolin (S. temminckii) is protected under the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA).66 The ESA prohibits the “take” of endangered species, prohibiting 
the killing of these species and destruction of their habitat. The ESA often limits export and import 
of listed species internationally, bringing the United States into alignment with CITES. In January 
2020, the Center for Biological Diversity, Humane Society International, Humane Society of the 
United States, Born Free USA, and the Natural Resources Defense Council joined together to sue 
the Trump Administration to list the other seven pangolin species under the ESA, but today the 
Temminck’s remains the only pangolin covered by the law in the United States.67 
Legal protections are only a portion of the conservation effort. Legislation is often 
hampered by ineffective enforcement, corruption, and limited meaningful international 
cooperation which allow pangolin poaching and trafficking to continue.68 
 
64 No Author. “Vietnam Strengthens Law Enforcement Efforts to Protect Wildlife. WildAid.  
https://wildaid.org/vietnampenalcode/. 
65 Southerland, Dan. “Record Pangolin Seizures in Asia Highlight Risk to Obscure Creature.” Radio Free Asia, April 
19, 2019. https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/pangolin-trafficking-04192019151944.html.  
66 United States Fish and Wildlife Service International Affairs. “Pangolins.” United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 
International Affairs, n.d. https://www.fws.gov/international/animals/pangolins.html.  
67 Center for Biological Diversity, Humane Society International, The Humane Society of the United States, Born 
Free USA, and Natural Resources Defense Council (Plaintiffs). Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive Relief. 
https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3-
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68 Prinsloo, Hendelene. “Scaling Up: The Rapid Growth in the Industrial Scale Trafficking of Pangolin Scales.” 
Wildlife Justice Commission, 2020. https://wildlifejustice.org/wp-
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COVID-19 and Pangolin Conservation 
Conservation efforts for pangolins have achieved minimal results thus far and have been 
complicated by the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. The COVID-19 pandemic caused by the 
SARS-CoV-2 virus uprooted the entire planet and impacted nearly every facet of life, while 
bringing a new level of notoriety to the previously little-known pangolin. On 30 January 2020, the 
WHO declared COVID-19 a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.  
As a coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2 is a zoonotic disease that originates in wildlife, often bats, 
and requires an intermediate host to transfer to humans. Shortly after the WHO declaration, 
scientists from South China Agricultural University announced on February 7 that they had 
identified a 99% likelihood that pangolins acted as the intermediate host for SARS-CoV-2.69 
Independent analysis in subsequent months has shown an 85-92% similarity between the SARS-
CoV-2 viral genome and pangolin coronaviruses.70 As of July 2020, the main hypothesis of 
transmission is that the virus moved from horseshoe bats to pangolins, although this finding is 
continually being studied.71  
Early in the pandemic, authorities in China identified a wet market in Wuhan, China as the 
epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic and deemed pangolins to be the most likely intermediate 
host for SARS-CoV-2. Pangolins are known carriers of coronaviruses, similar to SARS-CoV-2, 
and as the world’s most trafficked mammal are often illegally sold in markets like the one in 
Wuhan along with other trafficked wildlife. As of June 2020, no other potential intermediate host, 
such as snakes or pigs, has been identified as a more likely carrier of SARS-CoV-2 than pangolins, 
and the general scientific consensus at that time was a transmission chain from bats to pangolins 
to humans. In the following chapters, I will address the impact of COVID-19 on demand for 
pangolins and wildlife products and on the pangolin trafficking supply chain. 
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(April 20, 2020). https://doi.org/10.1016.j.cub.2020.03.022.  
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 In conclusion, demand for pangolin scales and meat is driving them toward extinction as 
pangolins are trafficked from African range states into Asia. Despite both international and 
domestic protections for these species, and the onset of the COVID-19 global pandemic with its 
linkages to pangolins and wildlife consumption, the state of pangolin conservation is dire. At the 
same time as pangolin exploitation was increasing, China’s Belt and Road Initiative began. In Part 
Two, I introduce key aspects of this initiative and the role of BRI on the African continent.  
PART TWO: THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE IN AFRICA 
The purpose of this study is to assess the level of impact the People’s Republic of China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – also known as the New Silk Road and One Belt One Road 
(OBOR) – has placed on African pangolin species through demand and supply pressures. In order 
to understand BRI and its global reach, this section provides an introduction to BRI which 
subsequent chapters will build upon.  
The Belt and Road Initiative is the sweeping plan by President Xi Jinping and the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) to engage with the rest of the world. “BRI” itself is an umbrella 
term encompassing the project’s two main components and its network of financial and 
infrastructure branches: The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 
(Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Planned BRI corridors. Image courtesy of Top China Travel.72 
 




In his 2013 introduction speech, President Xi described BRI as a 21st-century continuation 
of the Silk Roads from over 2,000 years ago, stating that “these ancient silk routes opened windows 
of friendly engagement among nations, adding a splendid chapter to the history of human 
progress…Spanning thousands of miles and years, the ancient silk routes embody the spirit of 
peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning, and mutual benefit.”73  
Through the act of making agreements with BRI partner states, President Xi and the CPC 
have stated that these partnerships will have four key characteristics: 1) Green, with deepened 
cooperation in environmental protection and biodiversity conservation, 2) Healthy, through 
increased exporting of Chinese medicine and cooperation on global diseases, 3) Intelligent, by 
utilizing vocational training and skills programs, and 4) Peaceful, by encouraging cooperation on 
issues of international security.74 These tenets are the basis of how President Xi and the CPC are 
presenting BRI to the world. 
Current Scope 
BRI is truly global in its reach. According to the Chinese government, by April 2019 the 
PRC had conducted outreach with over 125 countries across Asia, Africa, and Europe.75 The PRC 
also reported that by March 2020, 138 countries were considered “part of the BRI” through 
becoming signatories on memoranda of understanding with China (Figure 6).76 There is inherent 
difficulty in independently verifying which nations have signed MOUs with China to initiate an 
official BRI membership. While the Chinese government has reported over 100 nations as 
 
73 Xi, Jinping. “Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” 
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75 Dollar, David. “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Infrastructure Projects in Africa.” The Brookings Institution, 
September 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
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76 The Green Belt and Road Initiative Center. “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).” n.d. 
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participants in BRI, reflected in Figure 6, independent analyses place the number closer to 60 
countries,77 representing over 2/3 of the world’s population.78  
 
 
Figure 6. Countries with Signed BRI MOUs as of March 2020. 
Image courtesy of the Green Belt and Road Initiative Center.79 
 
The primary interaction between China and BRI partner countries is through lending to 
developing nations, to fund infrastructure projects including railways, ports, and water and energy 
projects.80 Within BRI participating countries, China has spent billions of dollars in supporting the 
construction of these projects while engaging in economic initiatives there.81 As of January 2020, 
according to the Council on Foreign Relations, China has spent approximately $200 billion on 
BRI-related programs, with Morgan Stanley estimating that China could spend $1.2-1.7 trillion by 
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2027.82 These funds are going toward the ‘construction’ of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road.  
In their 2018 analysis of BRI in Asia, OECD highlighted China’s efforts to construct six 
economic corridors which constitute the Silk Road Economic Belt:83 1) New Eurasia Land Bridge 
connecting Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, and Poland to Europe by rail; 2) China, Mongolia, Russia 
Economic Corridor, linking with the New Eurasia Land Bridge; 3) China, Central Asia, West Asia 
Economic Corridor, connecting to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey; 4) China Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, including 
Vietnam, Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Malaysia; 5) China, Pakistan Economic 
Corridor, connecting Kashgar city in Xinjiang Province with Pakistan via a deep-water port; and 
6) China, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar Economic Corridor, the status of which has become more 
tenuous given recent hostilities between China and India. India is also, as of June 2020, not a BRI 
participating country. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road will include African nations Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, and South Africa, as well as Indonesia, Korea, New Zealand, Panama, 
and the Maldives.84 These economic corridors are depicted in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Proposed BRI Economic Corridors and Projects Across Asia, Africa, and Europe. 
Image courtesy of OECD.85 
Criticisms of BRI 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has the potential to address infrastructure limitations in 
BRI partner countries. However, BRI has received criticism, particularly from Western nations 
like the United States, for its role in expanding China’s soft power influence outside of East Asia 
and engagement in ‘debt trap diplomacy,’ with the potential to spur a wave of debt crises in the 
developing world. 
In their recent book reviewing potential criminal activity along BRI, Lo et al coined the 
term “OBORization,” referring to the evolution of countries participating in BRI. They describe 
OBORization as a change with two meanings: 
 
 
85 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade,  




It refers to the process of the massive development of infrastructure in the OBOR region 
that helps increase trade, cultural exchanges, and government collaborations led by China 
for the purpose of speeding up the economic development in the region. It also refers to 
the process of using economic and other development alternatives to attract OBOR 
countries and make them more economically dependent on China’s financial support, 
more accepting politically and supportive of Chinese policies and global leadership, and 
legally more subject to the alternative modes of arbitration, governance, and globalization 
processes constructed and administered by China.86  
 
The idea of OBORization captures the critique that BRI is a tool for the Chinese 
government to expand its soft power past its immediate regional sphere of influence. BRI will give 
China the ability to open new corridors for trade and gain access to new natural resources, while 
attempting to “win over local populations and governments by funneling investment, jobs, and 
economic growth in their direction.”87 This critique aligns directly with President Xi’s vision of 
China as a more assertive global player, building up a network of economic connections outside 
of the influence of the West with China at its core.88 Not only does BRI allow China to promote 
its authoritarian model of governance, but the United States in particular has raised concerns that 
BRI may open the door for regional Chinese military expansion in BRI partner nations, challenging 
Western nations’ security interests.89 China’s growth across Africa, Asia, and into Europe 
coincides with the United States easing back from the Obama era “pivot to Asia,” as well as a 
move toward protectionism and limited diplomatic engagements in these regions, which lends 
itself to the concern of critics that BRI is an avenue for China to become a regional hegemon. 
BRI has raised concerns about the sustainability of debt relations in Asia and Africa, 
explored in the next section.90 As commercial loan terms facilitate debt crises, the process of 
countries taking on debt from China in the form of low-interest loans is raising fears that BRI may 
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lead countries to invest in projects they may be unable to pay off.91 From 2015-2017, Angola was 




Figure 8. Loan Activity between China and Africa.  
Adapted from Dollar, 2019 “Table 1: Largest African borrowers from China (2015-2017).”92 
 
The minimal transparency from the Chinese government regarding the terms and 
implementation of these projects also foments mistrust from outside observers and is a point of 
contention in discussions of BRI’s global economic impact.  
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BRI in Africa 
China began engagement with Africa on a large scale in the late 1950s which carried 
through the 1970s, as countries across the continent gained their independence (Appendix 1). 
Economic investment with Africa took off in the early 1990s, as China identified four major 
benefits to China of trade with Africa: 1) Africa’s natural resources could boost the Chinese 
domestic economy; 2) Africa’s large population could serve as a market for Chinese goods; 3) 
African countries were desirable for mineral prospecting, jobs for Chinese laborers, and 
infrastructure; and 4) Several African countries were suitable for Chinese investment.93 
China overtook the United States in 2010 as Africa’s largest economic partner. BRI will 
deepen this connection as officials in the Chinese government suggest that BRI illustrates China’s 
commitment to Africa.94 As of last year, over 40 out of Africa’s 55 states were signatories to 
memoranda of understanding for infrastructure projects in their countries.95 
The initial focus of BRI in Africa was on East Africa. The first major project was a 290-
mile standard gauge railway in Kenya, which opened in 2018, and connected Nairobi to 
Mombasa.96 It was the largest foreign investment in Kenya since the country’s independence in 
1963. Other projects include an electric railway connecting Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to Djibouti, 
where the Maritime Silk Road connects ports across Africa and Asia.97 Currently outside of 
Chinese BRI-related funding, the Chinese government has also offered its support for the pan-
African high-speed rail network proposed by the African Union.98 
Although one stated purpose of BRI is to provide development assistance for partner 
countries, China’s policy of utilizing Chinese labor for these projects has brought over 200,000 
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Chinese workers to Africa,99 particularly to Angola (81,154 workers), Ethiopia (19,470 workers), 
and Nigeria (17,314 workers) (Table 1). Chinese contract laborers have been part of the Chinese 
diaspora in Africa for several decades, and typically arrive to their African destination alone, don’t 
often speak the local language, and return to China at the end of their contract term.100 The presence 
of Chinese workers employed for construction on BRI projects is another point of contention, as 
those jobs could be employing African workers instead of importing them from abroad.101 Aside 
from Chinese contract laborers, Chinese professionals at diplomatic posts and companies as well 
as businesspeople and traders make up the Chinese diaspora in Africa.102 
Table 1. Number of Chinese Workers Employed in Africa, 2012-2017. Adapted from Dollar, 
2019 Table 2 “Chinese Workers in Africa.”103 
Country 2012-2014 2015-2017 Total Workers 
2012-2017 
Angola 48,120 33,034 81,154 
Kenya 3,430 8,099 11,529 
South Africa 3,436 966 4,402 
Egypt 740 1,899 2,639 
Zambia 6,659 7,311 13,970 
Cameroon 2,798 3,585 6,383 
Republic of Congo 10,120 6,711 16,831 
Uganda 1,737 4,529 6,266 
Ethiopia 9,630 9,840 19,470 
Nigeria 8,057 9,257 17,314 
Average 9,473 8,523  
Rest of Africa 2,707 3,107 5,814 
 
China’s engagement in Africa through BRI is a relatively new method of interaction with 
the continent, and is not homogeneous between nations, but builds upon a nearly 60-year history 
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of China-Africa relations. China has shown no desire to step away from the continent, instead 
continuing to invest and actively seek out new opportunities within BRI partner countries while 
attempting to cultivate new connections with countries that are unaffiliated with BRI. 
The growing Chinese footprint in Africa via BRI coincides with increased poaching 
pressure on African pangolins. This section laid the groundwork which subsequent chapters will 
build upon. The next section of this report describes the structure of this study to determine BRI’s 
influence on pangolin conservation. 
PART THREE: REPORT STRUCTURE 
Immediately preceding the CITES Appendix I pangolin listing, the IUCN SSC Pangolin 
Specialist Group submitted a comprehensive report to CITES at the 17th Conference of the Parties. 
In this report, the Pangolin Specialist Group noted that as China’s economic connections increase 
in Africa, increased wildlife exploitation will likely be observed.104 
This idea was expanded upon in a 2019 Nature article on the environmental impact of BRI 
on wildlife, as Mohammad Farhadinia and his colleagues proposed that BRI, specifically the 
planned China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, would have detrimental impacts on large carnivores 
in the project’s geographic footprint. Their concern was that BRI would lead not only to 
environmental degradation across Asia, but facilitate legal and illegal wildlife trade.  
As BRI accelerates construction of infrastructure, technological connectivity, new trade 
routes, and governmental cooperation, there is an elevated risk of corruption, economic and 
organized crime, and trafficking of illegal goods and services.105 
The purpose of this study is to determine if BRI in Africa has placed additional pressure 
on the four species of African pangolins and to predict the potential impacts BRI will have on 
African pangolin conservation in the future.  
Chapter One introduced the dual foci of this study: African pangolins and BRI. Chapter 
Two addresses the demand component of pangolin conservation, with particular emphasis on TCM 
as a vehicle for pangolin demand. In this chapter, I analyze the level of Chinese demand for 
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pangolins, to the extent it is known, and review the role of the Chinese healthcare industry in 
contributing to growing pangolin demand. Chapter Three is an analysis of the pangolin trafficking 
supply chain, from source countries in Africa to destination countries in Southeast and East Asia. 
This chapter includes an assessment of pangolin seizure events from 2010-2019, identification of 
prominent origin, transit, and destination countries as well as methods of trafficking and the 
structures of transnational crime organizations engaged in pangolin trafficking activity. It 
concludes with a case study of the relationship between the PRC and Nigeria through BRI, with a 
focus on Nigeria due to its role as a rapidly growing wildlife trafficking hub and the African nation 
most implicated in the pangolin trafficking supply chain. Chapter Four concludes this study by 
reiterating key findings, highlighting the many data gaps inherent in this work, offering policy 
recommendations for the United States and China, and considering the position of pangolin 
conservation as a policy issue in the current era of COVID-19 and rising geopolitical tensions 




Chapter Two: BRI and Pangolin Demand 
Across Asia, notably in China and Vietnam, pangolin consumption is scale-to-tail. 
Although pangolins have been internationally protected since 2017, trafficking of pangolins for 
their scales and meat continues at an accelerating pace. The cause? Demand. Two types of demand 
are particularly prevalent in China: the use of scales in TCM and the consumption of meat as a 
restaurant delicacy.  
In order to understand the impact of Belt and Road on demand for pangolins and their 
derivatives, Part One of this chapter discusses the significance of pangolins to Chinese culture, 
through their presence in TCM and consumption in restaurants. In Part Two, I ask two essential 
questions: 1) How has BRI influenced demand for pangolins? and 2) How will BRI influence 
demand for pangolins in the future. Part Three concludes the chapter with a discussion of key 
themes, data gaps, and an analysis of how COVID-19 has influenced demand for pangolins. 
PART ONE: CHINESE DEMAND FOR PANGOLINS 
Demand for pangolins in China and Vietnam is persistent and has increased in recent years. 
According to the UNODC, per the World Wildlife Seizures (World WISE) database, 
approximately 71% of pangolin seizures from 2007-2018 were destined for China, with 19 percent 
to Vietnam.106 Vietnam acts as both its own demand hub for pangolin products and as an avenue 
for wildlife to be trafficked into China, making it an essential piece of the pangolin conservation 
outlook.107 However, as accounts for the majority of pangolin TCM demand in the region, 
reviewing trends in TCM and pangolin demand are essential to understanding this issue. 
As China rises in affluence and increases its global profile, demand for TCM – and its 
subsequent consequence of increasing pangolin demand – is also on the rise. In the 2010s, these 
factors combined to cause the size of the wildlife black market to skyrocket and decimate pangolin 
populations.108  
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History and Significance of TCM in China and Across the Diaspora 
TCM as a practice originated over 5,000 years ago.109 Initial references to TCM in China 
occurred during the Zhou Dynasty (1122 BC) and the first pharmacopoeias were assembled in the 
Han period (206-220 BC).110 In the modern era, TCM was popularized by Mao Zedong, who 
encouraged the people of China to utilize TCM to treat a range of ailments. During the Mao era, 
TCM spread across Asia as migrants leaving China continued practicing TCM and shared its 
framework and remedies with others in their new countries.111 Today, TCM in its varied forms – 
acupuncture, herbal and wildlife-based medicine, massage, Tai Chi, and others – is prevalent 
globally.112 TCM is often used to treat chronic conditions or those that cannot be cured by Western 
medicine, and in the United States, Johns Hopkins recommends that TCM not be used “for serious 
conditions, but it may be beneficial when used as complementary therapy.”113 Acupuncture and 
herbal treatments are the most prevalent forms of TCM used in the United States and Europe. 
Combining TCM herb treatments with Western medicine does carry risks of adverse effects,114 
and the spread of TCM in Western nations is hampered by limited training for clinicians, 
pharmacists, and patients who self-administer,115 which is a roadblock TCM practitioners will have 
to overcome while promoting the practice globally. 
In China, however, TCM’s long history and central role in Chinese medical practice gives 
TCM a firm position in Chinese identity. As a result, demand for TCM products in China has 
proven very difficult to change. According to Feng Yibin, associate director of Hong Kong 
University’s School of Chinese Medicine, “It’s thousands of years of culture and history”116 and a 
thousand years of TCM makes it a formidable force for wildlife demand. The use of TCM for 
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primary care in China, complemented by Western medicine in some cases, represents the ‘China 
style approach’ to medicine, suggesting that while Western medicine may become more popular 
in China it will be utilized in tandem with TCM.117 
TCM is guided by the concept of qi, an energy both unique to the individual and flowing 
through the body on meridians to maintain health.118 In order to treat health imbalances, TCM acts 
to bring qi back into balance through use of diet, movement, and treatments based on combinations 
of plant and animal species. The efficacy of TCM as a whole is questioned by the scientific 
community, which points to limited studies providing evidence that TCM is more effective than 
Western medicine, or effective at all.119 This is primarily due to the combination of products 
combined to create one remedy, which is unique to the individual and cannot be replicated in large-
scale clinical trials. In some cases, use of animal-based TCM products has led to detrimental side 
effects for patients prescribed these treatments. 
Species Used 
The Chinese Pharmacopoeia contains remedies utilizing 12,772 types of TCM resources, 
1,574 of which are wildlife or their derivatives.120 Although demand for TCM has been present for 
millennia, the practice is partly responsible for the high levels of wildlife exploitation observed 
today. Population growth, coupled with increased buying power and interest in traditional 
remedies in China, has led to an unsustainable burden of TCM on wildlife populations and an 
inability to meet market demand.121 
The species most severely affected by TCM demand in Southeast and East Asia are the 
tiger, rhinoceros, saiga antelope, and pangolin (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Species including tiger, rhinoceros, and saiga are heavily impacted by  
their role in TCM. Photos courtesy of National Geographic, Nepr.net,  
and World Wildlife Fund.122 
 
Demand in Asian markets drives poaching and trafficking of tigers, with tiger bone, skin, 
claws, teeth, blood, and other derivatives used in TCM and other medicinal practices in Southeast 
and East Asia. Tiger bone in particular is traditionally one of the most important wildlife-based 
TCM ingredients, used to treat “ulcers, rat-bite sores, abdominal pain, typhoid fever, malaria, and 
hydrophobia, but especially to combat muscle cramps, migratory joint pain, pain in the bones, and 
rheumatism.”123 Tigers face a range of challenges in addition to wildlife crime, including habitat 
loss, the pet trade, and human-tiger conflict. Approximately 3,900 tigers remain in the wild today 
and trafficking for the purposes of TCM continues to be a major driver of population decline.124 
The primary threat to rhinoceros is poaching for their horn, which is made of keratin and 
the same material as human hair and fingernails – and pangolin scales. In TCM, rhino horn is “used 
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to cool the blood, alleviate fever, erythema, purpura, nosebleeds, convulsion and cramp, as well as 
heart disease.”125  Poaching of rhino for their horn has led several rhino species toward extinction. 
This is most notable in the Vietnamese subspecies of the Javan rhino, which went extinct in 2011, 
and the northern white rhino, which is now functionally extinct after the last male, Sudan, died in 
2018. The primary markets for rhino horn are Vietnam and China, and after a brief lull in rhino 
poaching, the illegal trade of rhino horns has increased in recent years. 
Saiga antelope (Saiga tatarica) are found in Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Russia, and 
Uzbekistan.126 These ungulates are poached for their horns and its use in TCM, which has led to 
population declines of 95% in the last 15 years.127 Saiga horn is used in TCM to “calm the liver, 
as a detoxification, to assuage epilepsy, and (similar to rhino horn) to alleviate (infant) fevers by 
sedation.128  
Many other species are utilized in TCM that are not mentioned here. This includes moon 
bears (Ursus thibetanus), whose gallbladder is harvested for ‘bear bile.’ Water buffalo (Bubalus 
bubalis) is used as an alternative to rhino horn. Chinese alligators (Alligator sinensis) are poached 
for their meat and its use in TCM. The use of wildlife for TCM is vast and variable, and species 
are affected not only by demand for their products but for their potential use as an alternative to 
other, more heavily exploited, wildlife. 
Pangolins in TCM 
Pangolin scales are the primary pangolin derivative used in TCM (compared to whole 
pangolins, meat, claws, or skins) and have been used in TCM for centuries. Scales can be dried, 
ground into powder, and consumed in powder or pill form. Scale powder can be inhaled, used to 
create a paste, or combined with other herbal and wildlife-based supplements to form a remedy 
that is unique to the ailment it is created to treat. As TCM products, pangolins and their medical 
derivatives are sold as part of China’s TCM industry and in smaller stores across mainland China. 
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Although pangolin scales are composed of keratin and have no proven scientific healing 
potential, a mixture of the placebo effect and cultural significance of TCM lead to continued use 
and TCM as an embedded part of the Chinese medical landscape.129 TCM, and the pangolin as a 
component of this practice, persists because of the power of belief in its healing properties. 
Of the over 1,500 remedies requiring wildlife ingredients, approximately 500 call for the 
use of pangolin.130 The Chinese pangolin (M. pentadactyla), now considered commercially extinct 
due to overexploitation for TCM, is the only pangolin species formally listed in the Chinese 
Pharmacopoeia131 though use of the other seven pangolin species to meet demand for TCM is a 
near certainty.  
The purported cures facilitated by pangolin-based TCM products are wide-ranging and 
stem from a belief that pangolin scales clear blockages in the body.132 Pangolin scales are used to 
treat hangovers, swelling, joint pain, and lactation issues, as well as other remedies for arthritis, 
palsy, skin diseases, and anorexia.133 In the most extreme form, pangolin scales are also believed 
to cure cancer.134 
Approximately 125 alternatives to pangolin scales exist in the Chinese Pharmacopoeia, 
yet demand persists for authentic pangolin scales in TCM.135 Chinese TCM consumers as a group 
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have a strong preference for wild TCM components over alternatives that are synthetic or 
farmed.136 The idea that ‘wild is best’ is enduring in the minds of many TCM consumers and 
practitioners, which complicates efforts by the conservation community to present viable synthetic 
alternatives to pangolin scales and lessen the burden on wild-sourced pangolins. 
TCM in China’s Medical Industry 
TCM holds a sizeable portion of the Chinese pharmaceutical market. TCM is valued at 
USD$130 billion in 2016137 and accounts for 31% of China’s USD$420 billion market.138 TCM 
grew an additional 20% throughout 2017. Through TCM in the pharmaceutical industry, in 
Chinese hospitals, and for public sale in shops and online, TCM has become a significant piece of 
China’s domestic pharmaceutical industry. 
In 1992, China had 2,297 TCM hospitals,139 and by the end of 2014 the number of hospitals 
focusing on TCM practice grew to 3,700 domestically, bringing in USD$105 billion in domestic 
revenue in 2014.140 As of July 1, 2017, per a TCM law passed by China’s National People’s 
Congress, TCM will be integrated by county governments into new publicly-funded hospitals, 
maternity wards, and pediatric clinics.141 Today, the total number of hospitals engaging with TCM 
is likely much higher than the value reflected in the 2014 statistic. 
Hospitals are also avenues for sales of TCM-based pharmaceutical products in China. 
Nearly 200 Chinese pharmaceutical companies, such as Kangmei Pharmaceutical, Tong Ren Tang, 
and China Traditional Medicine Holdings, are legally permitted to produce TCM products 
containing pangolins, in a domestic legislative loophole in China allowing pangolin use for 
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TCM.142 Once produced, pangolin-based pharmaceuticals are prescribed and sold in Chinese 
hospitals, creating a continuing stream of demand for pangolin products in TCM. Through this 
supply chain, TCM products are embedded within medical practice in China, external to 
pharmaceutical exports. 
As of 2016, Chinese pharmaceutical companies were able to produce 66 different products 
containing pangolin, requiring an estimated 400 tons of pangolin scales every year across the full 
industry.143 The Chinese government maintains that pangolin scales for pharmaceutical production 
are sourced by pre-existing stockpiles from the 1960s, supplying 26 tons of scales to the 
pharmaceutical industry every year.144 The size of the stockpile is not made publicly available by 
the Chinese government. However, it is highly unlikely that the pre-existing stockpile can meet 
continuing demand for pangolin scales used in TCM and, coupled with the difficulty in 
distinguishing pangolin scales by species, some individuals in the conservation community assert 
that the Chinese government stockpile may facilitate laundering of illegally procured pangolins. 
Restaurant Consumption 
Pangolins are served as a delicacy in Chinese restaurants in a variety of forms. Whether a 
pangolin product is offered as an infusion in rice wine, bones cooked into a pudding, an infant 
pangolin, or a live pangolin processed in front of customers at the dinner table, pangolins are 
considered a status symbol for the Chinese upper class.145 
Although the sale of pangolins is banned in China, lax enforcement of pangolin sales in 
restaurants allows the practice to continue ‘under the table.’ In instances where restaurants are 
illegally selling pangolins in contravention of domestic law, it leads to overall increased demand 
for pangolin products and continues to fuel the trade of these species. 
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Anecdotally, demand for pangolins in restaurants appears to be a smaller driver of pangolin 
exploitation than industrial scale use of pangolins in TCM. Quantitative analysis of pangolin 
demand in restaurants is lacking; however demand for use in restaurants should not be ignored in 
interventions to conserve pangolins.146 Once a market is established for a wildlife product, like 
pangolin meat in restaurants, it becomes much more difficult to stop. Restaurant consumption has 
the potential to become a larger driver of pangolin exploitation if left unaddressed. 
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Demand for Pangolins Extends Outside of China 
 
 Aside from consumption in Asian countries, including Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, pangolins are also consumed 
in African range states.  
 Historically, pangolins have been hunted as bushmeat, for their scales used in 
traditional African bush medicine, and for other cultural uses, such as protection from 
witchcraft, bad luck, and evil forces. Similar to their use in Southeast Asia and China, 
pangolins are consumed from head to tail to treat a wide variety of health ailments, including 
stroke, high blood pressure, and stomach problems. Pangolin meat is considered a delicacy 
and has been identified for sale in Nigeria, Botswana, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, and 
Mozambique. In Nigeria, local populations and Chinese travelers are the most frequent 
clients. 
Consumption of pangolins for these purposes in African range states is increasing, 
while African pangolin populations are facing increased trafficking stress along the Africa to 
Asia supply chain.  
Although pangolins are consumed outside of China, the focus of this study is on the 
impact of BRI on African pangolins. In order to isolate BRI as a potential driver of pangolin 
exploitation, an emphasis on China was necessary since China accounts for the largest share 
of the global market, followed closely by Vietnam, for pangolin products. 
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PART TWO: BRI INFLUENCES ON GLOBAL PANGOLIN DEMAND 
Research Questions 
In order to understand pangolin demand as it may be influenced by BRI, this study asks 
two research questions: 1) How has BRI influenced demand for pangolins outside of China? and 
2) How will BRI influence demand for pangolins outside of China in the future?  
Question 1: How has BRI Influenced Demand for Pangolins Outside of China? 
Analysis of the connections between BRI and TCM suggests that BRI has been an effective 
vehicle for global expansion of TCM. Through the construction of TCM centers in BRI partner 
countries, exports of TCM and related products to BRI countries, and the collaboration with China-
based pharmaceutical companies and BRI countries, China has effectively introduced TCM to the 
world. Increased global demand for TCM, coupled with the current role of pangolins in TCM 
remedies, suggest that BRI has contributed to a heightened demand for pangolin TCM products 
and placed additional pressure on African pangolin species. 
Construction of TCM Centers and Pharmaceutical Connectivity 
TCM centers and pharmaceutical exports provide the main outlet for China to increase 
demand for TCM outside of China. The TCM Belt and Road Initiative Plan (2016-2020) had a 
stated goal of constructing 30 TCM centers internationally in BRI countries by 2020.147 In 2017, 
17 TCM centers had been constructed along the Belt and Road, in countries including Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, and Malaysia. During a May 2018 speech, President Xi reiterated the importance of 
reaching this goal and stated that 57 TCM centers were completed or in development in BRI 
nations.148  
Pharmaceutical companies producing TCM are key to BRI outreach, not only in shipping 
their product globally but also in developing connections with BRI countries. Foci, a 
pharmaceutical company based in northwest China, has exported TCM through direct 
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collaboration with 28 countries globally, and additional initiatives to involve pharmaceutical 
companies in this outreach related to BRI are ongoing.149 
TCM Exports 
Through exporting TCM products abroad, China is encouraging the development of an 
international demand market for TCM, not only among the Chinese diaspora but among the larger 
international consumer base of BRI countries. In 2016, China exported TCM products to 185 
countries.150 TCM exports from China increased by 54% from 2016-2017,151 accounting for 
USD$3.6 billion in revenue in 2017.152 
In addition to exporting TCM to BRI countries in Asia and Africa, demand for TCM 
products has risen in the United States and Europe. Approximately 15% of China’s TCM annual 
export in 2016 went to the United States, with a net worth of USD$526 million.153 The U.S. and 
several European countries act as transit hubs and destination markets for trafficked pangolins (see 
Chapter Three), so the growth of TCM exports to these regions may further solidify demand for 
pangolins in TCM, though the exact levels of demand for these products in the  
West are unknown. 
Question 2: How will BRI Influence Demand for Pangolins in the Future? 
When looking ahead to the future, current trends around the prominence of TCM in BRI 
countries are not encouraging for pangolins. President Xi has tied TCM to BRI and does not show 
any signs of changing course. The WHO recently included TCM in its International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, acknowledging TCM as a valid medical 
practice for use globally. There is the potential, however, for change at the domestic level as 
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incremental steps to separate pangolins from TCM, most notably the partial removal from the 
Chinese Pharmacopoeia and grade school textbooks, have been undertaken. 
The Intertwined TCM and BRI 
As China acts to expand its soft power influence through BRI, TCM is an excellent and 
unassuming vehicle with which to do so. Many practices within TCM are benign and have little 
impact on the environment. Wildlife-based remedies, particularly those with pangolins, are the 
major exception. Through BRI, TCM remedies are reaching a wider global audience than ever 
before, while simultaneously becoming more prolific in mainland China. 
President Xi has long been a public figure firmly in support of TCM practices and is 
actively promoting TCM as a prominent component of China’s global identity. According to 
Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, President Xi and fellow TCM 
supporters in the CPC have created “a discourse that makes support of TCM a patriotic duty in 
China.”154 Beijing’s city government has taken an additional step to codify this patriotic duty 
through the draft regulation in June 2020 that would “[ban] people from denigrating or defaming 
Traditional Chinese medicine,” which could carry additional criminal punishment if passed.155 
Although this action was met with fierce criticism during its public comment period, it signals the 
intention of the Chinese government to continue to promote TCM as part of Chinese civic duty 
and identity.  
TCM’s Global Recognition by the World Health Organization 
While China is promoting TCM abroad as part of the Belt and Road, China is also making 
progress in expanding TCM through advocacy with the World Health Organization (WHO). At 
WHO’s 72nd World Health Assembly in Geneva in May 2019, the WHO included TCM in its 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) for the first time.156 The ICD acts as “the 
international standard for reporting diseases and health conditions [and] is the diagnostic 
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classification standard for all clinical and research purposes” in the WHO’s 194 Member States.157 
This listing was inclusive of 400 TCM diagnoses and dictates the healthcare agenda of over 100 
nations.158 
Fierce criticism of the WHO decision stemmed from two communities: wildlife 
conservationist organizations and members of the medical and epistemic community. Due to the 
prevalent role of wildlife in TCM, conservationists see the decision by the WHO as one that will 
open a door to further exploitation of wildlife and their habitats. The medical and epistemic 
community sees TCM as unscientific, in reference to the over 230,000 annual documented 
negative side effects to use of wildlife TCM products.159 In response to these critiques, the WHO 
stated that its TCM strategy simply “provides guidance to Member States and other stakeholders 
for regulation and integration of safe and quality assured traditional and complementary medicine 
products, practices, and practitioners.”160 Outside observers are also casting a suspicious eye 
toward the WHO’s decision and its role in boosting China’s international standing through public 
health leadership. China’s April pledge of an additional USD$30 million in support to the WHO 
to combat COVID-19 was met with skepticism.161 This action was seen as an attempt to boost 
China’s global image after the PRC initially hindered the pandemic response and the WHO was 
slow to act. The combination of inadequacy in coordinating a global response to the COVID-19 
pandemic and a perceived shift toward China, particularly under the tenure of Margaret Chan from 
2006-2017, make the decision to include TCM on the International Classification of Diseases a 
curious one.  
This listing is expected to increase demand for TCM globally as it is integrated into national 
health programs around the world, at low cost and therefore desirable to insurance companies, with 
its associated effects being highly detrimental to wildlife – especially pangolins. 
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Pushback Against Using Wildlife in TCM 
Amidst the pro-TCM environment cultivated by President Xi and the CPC, and increasing 
international acceptance and demand for TCM products worldwide through BRI and elsewhere, 
domestic forces in China may be pushing against this eventuality. 
Beginning in January 2020, China announced that its national insurance would no longer 
cover TCM containing pangolin products.162 This may have the dual benefit of increasing costs of 
pharmaceutical products using pangolins, while also deterring individuals who see this decision 
by the Chinese government as instructive for their purchasing decisions.  
In several cases, there have also been examples of TCM practitioners working to distance 
themselves from use of wildlife products in TCM, because of its role in facilitating wildlife 
trafficking.163  
Most significant is China’s decision in early June 2020 to remove pangolins from the 
Chinese Pharmacopoeia as a legitimate and government-endorsed TCM ingredient, while 
bolstering its protection to a Class I species under the Wildlife Protection Law. Protection remains 
incomplete, however, as a result of the Wildlife Protection Law’s loophole permitting pangolins 
from government stockpiles to be utilized by pharmaceutical companies in patent medicines.164 
The decision to remove pangolins from the pharmacopoeia was not without precedent. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, species of tiger and rhinoceros that were heavily impacted by TCM demand were 
placed on CITES Appendix I, while tiger bone, rhino horn, and other derivatives from these species 
were progressively removed from the Chinese Pharmacopoeia from 1963-2010.165 
Unfortunately for the pangolin, and many other species of imperiled wildlife, removal from 
the pharmacopoeia and CITES listing does not equate with a permanent cessation of use in TCM. 
Rhinoceros are still poached heavily for their horns, as are tigers for their myriad parts utilized in 
TCM. A combination of tradition, misinformation, and minimal enforcement create an 
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environment where species continue to be used in TCM long after they are removed from the 
official listing. TCM use can be responsive to public pressure, but it must be maintained over the 
long-term in order to achieve conservation successes for these species. 
PART THREE: CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
Increasing demand for TCM products in mainland China, combined with the CPC’s active 
promotion of TCM along BRI, suggest that BRI has and will continue to be utilized as a tool to 
increase demand for TCM products globally. Simultaneously, strong demand for pangolins’ scales 
and meat in mainland China is placing extreme pressure on all eight species of pangolin to meet 
demand. For thousands of years, until early July 2020, pangolins were listed in the various 
iterations of the Chinese Pharmacopoeia as a component of multiple TCM remedies. In its most 
basic form, if China is promoting TCM abroad in BRI countries and not fully protecting pangolins 
as a TCM ingredient, then BRI will facilitate increased demand for pangolins.  
Domestically, China has protected pangolins under the Wildlife Protection Law by 
classifying them as Class I species and removed them from the Chinese Pharmacopoeia as a raw 
ingredient used in TCM. These actions were incomplete protection for pangolins, with the Wildlife 
Protection Law loophole allowing pangolins to be sourced from government stockpiles – which 
are unlikely to meet demand and help to launder illegally-sourced pangolins – and with the 
pharmacopoeia retaining pangolins as key ingredients for several patent medicines produced and 
exported by Chinese pharmaceutical companies. As pharmaceutical companies continue to export 
globally, including to BRI partner countries, and as TCM centers are built abroad along the BRI, 
with these legal shortcomings in pangolin protection it is likely that BRI will continue to act as a 
form of increasing demand for TCM and pangolin products.  
If China is serious about protecting pangolins, both domestically and in cooperation with 
BRI member nations, the Wildlife Protection Law and pharmacopoeia loopholes will need to be 
addressed. Also, through President Xi and the CPC’s promotion of TCM through BRI, more 
explicit discussion of reducing the use of pangolin in TCM is needed, particularly in instances of 
the Chinese medical industry (through pharmaceutical exports and TCM centers) offering TCM 
solutions in countries where domestic pangolin protections are limited. These efforts, in 
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coordination with demand reduction campaigns and more holistic domestic protections in China 
and BRI countries, can provide a lifeline for pangolins.  
If left in its current state, however, China’s promotion of TCM and incomplete protection 
for pangolins in TCM along the BRI will likely increase demand for pangolins, with devastating 
consequence for all eight species. As one of the largest demand markets with a growing 
international footprint, China has the ability to decide whether their use of pangolin products will 
become sustainable or whether demand for TCM will drive pangolins to extinction. 
The Role of COVID-19 on Pangolin Demand 
The specific consequence in China of pangolins being implicated as the intermediate host 
of SARS-CoV-2 between bats and humans has not yet been analyzed and made publicly available 
in the form of a peer-reviewed study. However, in order to determine the role COVID-19 on 
pangolin demand in China, trends from the 2002-2003 SARS epidemic and a study of Southeast 
Asian responses to COVID-19 and wildlife consumption can be informative. 
After the emergence of SARS-CoV and its subsequent epidemic, the scientific community 
identified bats as the initial host, who transferred the virus to masked palm civets (Paguma 
larvata), a type of wild cat.166 The civet, present in a live animal market, then transmitted the virus 
to humans.167 Civet consumption was banned in China as a result of its implied role as the 
intermediate host and demand decreased after the emergence of the virus. However, demand for 
civet cats has risen to higher levels today as a result of their use in the production of kopi luwak, 
coffee brewed from partially digested coffee beans consumed by civets.  
If the last SARS epidemic can be used as a model, pangolin demand may decrease in the 
wake of COVID-19 yet increase when the threat of coronavirus has passed, as has been the pattern 
with SARS and MERS. The trend of an initial decrease in demand after the emergence of a 
zoonotic disease is reflected by a March 2020 study sponsored by World Wildlife Fund and 
conducted by GlobeScan. Researchers interviewed 5,000 respondents across five wildlife markets, 
located in Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, to understand the role of 
 
166 PLOS. "Bat Cave Study Sheds New Light on Origin of SARS Virus: Newly Discovered SARS Strains in Bats  
Hold Genetic Clues to the Evolution of a Human Pandemic Strain." ScienceDaily, 30 November 2017. 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/11/171130141222.htm. 
167 Wang, L.F. and B.T. Eaton. “Bats, Civets, and the Emergence of SARS.” PubMed, 2007.  
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17848070/. 
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the COVID-19 pandemic on consumer behavior in wildlife markets. As COVID-19 is alleged to 
have originated through an illegal pangolin sale in a wildlife market, this study aimed to determine 
what impact, if any, the wildlife origin of the pandemic may have on their decision making. In the 
study, 84% of individuals said they were unlikely or very unlikely to buy wildlife products in open 
wildlife markets in the future, with 91% stating that they were unlikely or very unlikely to buy 
wildlife products in illegal and unregulated markets selling wild animals in the future.168 The main 
limitations for the purpose of this report is that the results were geared toward consumption in 
wildlife markets, rather than use of pharmaceuticals or in restaurants, and did not include mainland 
China. Hong Kong and Vietnam are prominent consumers of wildlife, including pangolin, so 
although China is not included in this study it may be instructive of how consumers in these areas 
are thinking about purchasing wildlife in markets. 
Although the initial demand decrease was observed in the WWF/GlobeScan survey, 
COVID-19 is inherently different due to its global reach and high number of cases. By July 2003, 
29 countries reported 8,098 probable SARS cases to the WHO.169 As of 11:48 am CEST on July 
7, 2020, the WHO had received reports of 13,575,158 confirmed cases of COVID-19, accounting 
for almost every country on the planet.170 As a global pandemic, COVID-19 may become more 
influential than SARS in decreasing demand for pangolins. In order for temporary demand 
reduction to be permanent, consumers will need to make the intellectual connection between 
pangolins and COVID-19. In the coming months, countries where demand for pangolins is 
traditionally high and that were successful in mitigating the spread of COVID-19, will be important 
to observe in order to understand the role of COVID-19 in overall pangolin demand. 
Another aspect of pangolin demand amid COVID-19 is the Chinese government’s use of 
TCM products and practices to treat the pandemic – both domestically and abroad. Despite no 
scientific evidence of TCM’s efficacy on a large scale, Chinese state media reported in March 
2020 that over 74,000 COVID-19 patients in the country had been treated with TCM.171 As part 
 
168 GlobeScan and World Wildlife Fund. “Opinion Survey on COVID-19 and Wildlife Trade in 5 Asian Markets.”  
April 6, 2020. https://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/opinion-survey-on-covid-19-and-wildlife-trade-
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169 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Surveillance and  
Reporting.” January 8, 2004. https://www.cdc.gov/sars/surveillance/index.html. 
170 World Health Organization. “WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard. Last updated July 17, 2020. 
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of the PRC’s international COVID-19 aid efforts, TCM professionals and products have been 
dispatched to countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, where China saw a window to provide 
scientifically dubious TCM treatments in countries with otherwise insufficient public health 
infrastructure.172  
Data Gaps and Areas for Future Research 
Unfortunately, attempting to determine the impact of BRI on demand for African pangolins 
is hindered by data gaps in several key areas. Continued research support would allow 
conservationists to better understand the exact nature of demand in China and its BRI partner 
countries in order to pinpoint where intervention and demand reduction strategies would be most 
influential. 
Studies measuring pangolin demand are limited. There are few comprehensive studies 
interpreting pangolin seizure data and limited data measuring consumer demand for pangolins. 
This is a significant hindrance to understanding the level of demand for pangolins in China and 
within BRI partner countries. Also, the breakdown of demand for pangolin meat in restaurants 
compared to TCM is unclear, as it is extrapolated primarily from seizure data on trafficked whole 
pangolins or pangolin meat to measure restaurant demand and pangolin scales to measure TCM 
demand. Overall, information on pangolin demand comes from independent journalism and 
anecdotal evidence, almost exclusively with very small sample sizes which limit understanding of 
larger demand trends. Future research on demand for pangolins is needed.  
Publicly available information on TCM exports is also limited. For this study, the best-case 
scenario would have been the ability to measure pangolin-based TCM exports to BRI countries, in 
order to understand the exact level of TCM including pangolins, which essentially remains legal 
due to a TCM loophole for China-based pharmaceutical companies. Knowing the exact volume of 
TCM exports containing pangolin derivatives would allow researchers to map demand trends over 
time. 
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The level of demand for pangolins from different outlets is not well-understood. Pangolin 
scales are utilized for TCM, but the share of the market between legal and illegal TCM sellers, as 
well as online purchase compared to shops or markets is also unknown.173  
The exact impact of COVID-19 in pangolin demand in China is unknown. The 
WWF/GlobeScan study of Southeast Asian countries is informative, as is Chinese citizens’ 
previous interaction with civets after the SARS epidemic. However, no study has measured 
demand for pangolins in China since the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan. In response to the 
assertion that SARS-CoV-2 was transmitted from pangolins to humans in a wildlife market in 
Wuhan, the Chinese government closed wildlife markets, some of which act as an outlet for 
trafficked wildlife. Studies on consumer demand, including preferences for buying in a market 
versus online, would be helpful to understand the influence of this pandemic on consumption in 
China. 
 
173 Prinsloo, Hendelene. “Scaling Up: The Rapid Growth in the Industrial Scale Trafficking of Pangolin Scales.”  
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 49 
Chapter Three: The Pangolin Trafficking Supply Chain 
Pangolin poaching and trafficking remains the greatest threat to the survival of all eight 
pangolin species. Historically, trafficking of Asian pangolins dominated the pangolin trafficking 
landscape. In 2013, Africa overtook Asia as the primary source region for pangolins, per seizure 
data.174 Potential reasons for this shift include an overexploitation of Asian pangolins and the 
development of economic ties between East Asia and African nations where trafficked pangolins 
originated.175 With the establishment of BRI also in 2013, it is an important research question to 
determine if BRI had any impact on trafficking of African pangolins, which is the purpose of this 
chapter. 
In Part One of this chapter, I provide pertinent information on the scale of the pangolin 
trafficking problem by describing pangolin seizure data and identifying national actors as key 
source countries, transit countries, or destination countries, following the definitional structure 
provided by the TRAFFIC/USAID In Plane Sight report.176 In Part Two, I analyze the impact of 
BRI on African pangolin trafficking with two research questions: 1) How has BRI influenced 
trafficking of African pangolins? and 2) How might BRI influence African pangolin trafficking in 
the future? Lastly, in Part Three, I discuss the key findings of this analysis, review data gaps and 
areas for further research, and interpret the impact of COVID-19 on wildlife trafficking, including 
pangolins. 
PART ONE: THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM 
Pangolin Trafficking at a Glance 
The primary indicator the conservation and international law enforcement communities use 
to understand the pressure wildlife crime places on wildlife populations is seizure data. Through 
 
174 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Wildlife Crime: Pangolin Scales.” United Nations Office on Drugs 
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analyzing seizure data, we know that pangolins constitute approximately 20% of the illegal 
wildlife trade177 and that today pangolins are trafficked at a rate ten times higher than observed in 
2014.178 After an April 2019 seizure in Singapore, the total value of pangolin products seized by 
law enforcement crossed the USD$100 million mark.179 Although pangolin trafficking reached 
this grisly benchmark, high-profile large seizures have continued at a staggering pace. Seized 
pangolin shipments are believed to only account for 10% of the true scale of the pangolin 




The seizure data presented in this report are sourced from two studies of global pangolin 
trafficking that, within the conservation community, are considered to be thorough reports about 
the state of pangolin trafficking for the time periods described in each study.  
The first report, The Global Trafficking of Pangolins: A Comprehensive Summary of 
Seizures and Trafficking Routes from 2010 to 2015, was released by TRAFFIC in December of 
2017.181 TRAFFIC is a United Kingdom charity, created through a joint venture of the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF), that 
“plays a unique and leading role as a global wildlife trade specialist.”182 The report provided a 
detailed assessment of seized quantities of pangolins, with seizure data disaggregated by scales, 
meat, and whole animals, while also identifying key nations in the global pangolin trafficking 
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supply chain. The report also pinpointed international trade routes used by transnational criminal 
organizations engaging in pangolin trafficking, both established and new, and provided 
recommendations for national governments and the conservation community. Prior to the 
publication of this report, no global pangolin trafficking assessment existed. 
The second report, Scaling Up: The Rapid Growth in the Industrial Scale Trafficking of 
Pangolin Scales, 2016-2019, was released by the Wildlife Justice Commission in February 
2020.183 The Wildlife Justice Commission (WJC) is a non-profit headquartered in The Hague, 
Netherlands, which operates “globally to disrupt and help dismantle organized transnational 
criminal networks trading in wildlife, timber, and fish.”184 The WJC report built upon the 2017 
TRAFFIC report by analyzing pangolin seizure data and combining them with the findings of 
WJC’s Intelligence Development Unit, resulting in “a comprehensive understanding of the key 
countries, smuggling routes, shipping methods, destinations, and pricings of pangolin scales.”185 
The main findings of this report suggest that pangolin trafficking from 2016-2019 increased 
precipitously, further endangering pangolin species across the entirety of their range. 
The TRAFFIC and WJC studies are the most complete seizure data reports for pangolin 
trafficking analysis of the last ten years. Attempting to recreate the data sets used in these studies 
with publicly available, and inherently less thorough data, would result in a less effective measure 
of pangolin trafficking than what is reported in the two selected assessments. TRAFFIC collected 
data on 1,270 pangolin seizure incidents reported in multiple sources, including online media 
outlets, CITES open data, and NGO publications, yet also submitted requests for seizure reporting 
from 179 CITES Management authorities and relied upon internal datasets assembled by Dan 
Challender and TRAFFIC, as well as sourcing from multiple countries’ law enforcement systems. 
WJC combined open source media reporting of 52 pangolin scale seizures from open source media 
reporting with independent assessment by the WJC Intelligence Division to arrive at their 
assessment. 
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In reviewing the quantities of seized pangolin products presented below, it is important to 
note two caveats which prevent the direct comparison of each report’s findings: 1) The TRAFFIC 
report details seizures of multiple pangolin derivatives, namely scales, body parts, and whole 
pangolins, while the WJC report describes scale seizures only; and 2) Quantities of scales seized 
are not fully comprehensive and cannot be compared equally. Both reports describe large quantity 
seizures yet provide different criteria for what can be considered a large quantity scale seizure. In 
the TRAFFIC report, large quantity seizures of pangolin scales are those greater than or equal to 
1,000 kg (also reported as 1 metric ton), while WJC defines large scale seizures as those above 
500 kg, leading to potential discrepancies between the WJC and TRAFFIC report of seizures 
between 500-999 kg. Although small-scale seizures occur, where individuals are caught by law 
enforcement attempting to smuggle pangolin products across borders in luggage or other parcels, 
both reports focus on industrial, large-scale trafficking, which is the primary data point for this 
chapter. 
Seizure Data Limitations 
In order to measure the scope of pangolin trafficking globally, seizure data are the best 
metric we have, despite many limitations. Seizure data are mixed indicators, reliant upon different 
countries’ varied levels of law enforcement capacity, reporting ability and willingness to share 
seizure data, and prioritization of wildlife crime enforcement. This greatly complicates global 
seizure data analyses. 
Wholesale identification of pangolin species involved in the global trade, or even in 
individual seizures, is incredibly difficult. As pangolin products move up the supply chain, they 
are consolidated with other species. If a shipment is primarily composed of scales, identifying 
scales at the species level is a challenge and as a result, much seizure reporting is done at the genus 
or family level. In countries like the U.S. where only one of the eight pangolin species are federally 
protected, this makes enforcement even more challenging. 
Seizures are reflective of only the unsuccessful smuggling attempts. They also can be 
misleading, with discrepancies in transit/destination countries on bills of lading compared to the 
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true route, or can reflect successful enforcement action in the country that conducted the seizure 
rather than indicate a problem.186 
For organizations like TRAFFIC and WJC who work to compile comprehensive seizure 
reports such as these, their work is highly complex because seizures are not reported in uniform 
weights. Although some seizure incidents are described in terms of kilograms, tons, or metric 
tonnes, there are also large amounts of more qualitative reports like “bags of scales” or whole 
specimens not identified at the species level, and therefore without a corresponding weight. 
Lastly, since many pangolin shipments are not identified at the species level and ranges of 
multiple species overlap, particularly in Africa, it is nearly impossible to make any determination 
about the number of individual pangolins accounted for in seizure data. Pangolin species vary in 
size from 3.5 pounds to 75 pounds, making assessment of individuals based only on mixed scales 
highly difficult.187 Not only is the conservation community operating at a knowledge deficit for 
population studies of wild pangolins, but inability to accurately characterize species of seized 
pangolin contraband is another complicating factor in assessing the status of pangolin trafficking. 
Despite all of those limitations, seizure data are accepted as the best proxy indicator for 
measuring wildlife exploitation that is available today. 
Volume of the Trade 
Between 2010-2015, TRAFFIC reported the seizure of 55.3 tons of pangolin scales and 
5,613 individual scales (Table 2). The prominent roles of Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Lao 
PDR reflect Southeast Asia’s role as “the epicenter of the global wildlife trade,” where 35 million 
CITES-listed plants and animals were traded from 1998-2007.188  
All of the countries listed on Table 2 are pangolin range states, with the exception of 
Germany and the United States, illustrating these two Western countries’ positions as demand and 
transit countries in the global pangolin trade. The United States was a destination for pangolin 
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body parts,189 which is consistent with the belief that the U.S. is the second largest consumer 
market for wildlife products, behind China.190 European countries, particularly Germany, France, 
and Belgium, acted as a transit hub for African pangolins shipped to Asia.191 
In terms of African pangolins, from 2010-2015, Nigeria was the only African nation 
implicated as one of the top countries or territories involved in the pangolin trade.  
For all shipments recorded, 55% of the largest shipments seized originated in African 
countries, primarily in Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Uganda, reflecting the growing 
pattern of large quantity pangolin shipments originating on the African continent.192 
Overall, the proportion of large shipments from 2010-2015 increased over time, which the 
authors of the TRAFFIC report mentioned but is difficult to independently interpret based on 
individual countries without direct access to the original data. 
Table 2. Total weight of trafficked pangolin linked to countries and territories, independent 
of role in supply chain, 2010-2015. Adapted from TRAFFIC Table 2, “Top 10 countries or 
territories ranked by the total number of international trafficking incidents of pangolins (Manis 
spp.) in which they were involved, regardless of their role in the trade route.” 
Country/Territory Scales (kg) Body Parts 
(kg) 
Whole (kg) Total (kg) 
Indonesia 4,103 - 45,140 49,243 
Vietnam 7,487 2,119 19,125 28,731 
China 16,291 2,290 6,408 24,989 
Malaysia 10,534 - 5,061 15,595 
Hong Kong SAR 7,148 - 600 7,748 
Nigeria 6,373 26 10 6,409 
Lao PDR 1,914 - 61 1,975 
Thailand 1,222 - 61 1,283 
Germany 667 26 - 693 
United States 1 5 - 6 
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From 2016-2019, WJC reported the seizure of 206.4 tons of pangolin scales intercepted in 
52 seizures (Table 3). As a reminder, the larger sample size of the WJC report, compared to that 
of TRAFFIC, may account for the drastic observed increase from 55.3 tons of scales to 206.4 tons 
of scales. However, the data in the WJC report reflect a shift toward fewer, larger shipments of 
scales trafficked from Africa into Southeast and East Asia. The overall average size of shipments 
increased by 138% from 2018-2019.193 
In their analysis, WJC found that six of the 27 countries and territories implicated in the 
global pangolin trafficking supply chain were responsible for 94% of all seizures: Nigeria, 
Vietnam, China, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Each of 
these countries and territories, with the exception of South Korea, is home to at least one species 
of pangolin. Nigeria, Vietnam, and China were the three countries with the highest attributed 
weight of trafficked pangolins independent of their role in the supply chain, with Nigeria 
increasing by five times from 2016-2019. Vietnam and Singapore experienced large increases in 
linked weight between 2018 and 2019, while trends in China and Hong Kong were variable from 
year to year. 
Table 3. Total weight of trafficked pangolin linked to countries and territories, independent 
of role in supply chain, 2016-2019. Adapted from Wildlife Justice Commission Table 3, 
“Countries/territories and highest weight linked regardless of the role, per year (2016-2019).” 
Country/Territory 2016 (kg) 2017 (kg) 2018 (kg) 2019 (kg) Total 
(kg) 
Nigeria 10,400 13,250 36,557 52,923 113,130 
Vietnam - - 17,411 57,873 75,284 
China 4,700 31,859 7,260 10,650 54,469 
Singapore - - 3,800 41,513 45,313 
Hong Kong SAR 13,400 7,200 12,330 8,300 41,230 
Democratic Republic of Congo 2,900 6,000 5,600 17,100 31,600 
Cameroon 4,670 6,450 2,518 3,100 16,738 
Malaysia 670 13,059 - - 13,729 
South Korea - - - 10,650 10,650 
Lao PDR 6,300 - - - 6,300 
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From 2010-2015, China, Malaysia, and Vietnam were the countries with the largest 
associated weight of pangolin scales, regardless of their role. In 2016-2019, Nigeria overtook these 
three countries and the volume of seized scales associated with Nigeria escalated quickly.  
Pangolin Trafficking in Source and Origin Countries 
Source countries can be defined as “the origin of trafficked wildlife or wildlife products” 
while origin countries are “the origin of a trafficking instance.”194 One is a measure of the wildlife 
and the other of the trafficking action. 
Per the 2017 TRAFFIC report, from 2010-2015, African countries were primarily origin 
countries, with Nigeria, Cameroon, Guinea, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda, and Togo all implicated in five or more pangolin trafficking 
events during this period and 55% of all large quantity shipments originated in Africa. In alignment 
with the continuing shift from Asian to African origin countries, from 2016-2019 only one of the 
twelve countries identified as a prominent origin country, Indonesia, was geographically outside 
of Africa (Table 4).  
Table 4. Pangolins seized by weight in origin countries. Adapted from Wildlife Justice 











Nigeria 10,400 12,200 21,805 52,923 97,328 
Democratic Republic of the Congo  2,900 6,000 5,600 17,100 31,600 
Uganda - 6,000 - - 6,000 
Cameroon 4,670 - - - 4,670 
Liberia - 3,000 - - 3,000 
Burkina Faso - 3,000 - - 3,000 
Côte d’Ivoire - 3,000 - - 3,000 
Congo 2,900 - - - 2,900 
Ghana 2,100 - - - 2,100 
Central African Republic - - 718 - 718 
Indonesia - - 630 - 630 
Guinea 500 - - - 500 
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As a measure of total weight, Nigeria and Democratic Republic of the Congo were 
connected with 82.94% of pangolin scales seized from 2016-2019 and were identified by WJC as 
two “major players” in pangolin trafficking today. It is important to recall that this does not 
precisely mean that 82.94% of seized pangolin scales were from pangolins endemic to Nigeria and 
DRC, but that these countries were origin countries – the start of the pangolin trafficking supply 
chain. Although both Nigeria and DRC are range states, because of incomplete documentation, 
difficulty identifying seized pangolins at the species level, and the possibility that traffickers 
moved pangolins into these countries where they were consolidated and trafficked from there, we 
cannot assert definitively Nigeria and DRC are source countries, only countries of origin. This 
does not invalidate the necessity to address Nigeria and DRC as the start of the pangolin trafficking 
supply chain. 
Pangolin Trafficking Between Origin and Destination Locations 
Prominent Transit Countries and Smuggling Routes 
Transit countries are defined as “the intended transit point(s) for a trafficking instance on 
the way from its origin location to its destination location.”195 From 2010-2015, TRAFFIC 
identified 159 unique international routes, with an average of 27 new routes emerging each year. 
This information suggests that pangolin trafficking is a highly mobile enterprise with transnational 
crime organizations capable of adjusting trafficking routes as needed. In the 2016-2019 data, 
Nigeria, Cameroon, and DRC were implicated as key pangolin smuggling routes (Table 5). 
Nigeria, Vietnam, and Hong Kong SAR are growing in prominence with Singapore appearing to 
be an increasingly important transit hub between them.196 
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Table 5. Prominent pangolin trafficking routes. Adapted from Wildlife Justice Commission 
Table 9 “Smuggling routes linked to highest volume of scales (2016-2019).” 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
Nigeria – Hong Kong 
SAR: 7,300 kg 
Malaysia – China: 
13,059 kg 
Nigeria – Hong Kong 
SAR: 11,700 kg 
Nigeria – (Singapore 
– Vietnam: 33,973 kg 
Cameroon – Hong 
Kong SAR: 4,000 kg 
Nigeria – Hong Kong 
SAR: 7,200 kg 
Nigeria – Vietnam: 
10,823 kg 
DRC – (Singapore) – 
Vietnam: 15,900 kg 
Nigeria – China: 
3,100 kg 
Nigeria – Malaysia – 
China: 5,000 kg 
DRC – Singapore – 
Vietnam: 3,800 kg 
Nigeria – Hong Kong 
SAR: 8,300 kg 
 
Hong Kong SAR is an important player in the global wildlife trade as a whole and is active 
in pangolin trafficking. From 2014-2018, 53 tons of pangolin scales were seized on their way into 
China from Hong Kong and the open economic nature of Hong Kong in previous years has made 
it a formidable challenge to curbing wildlife trafficking in the region.197 According to Tse Chin-
wan, Hong Kong’s undersecretary for the environment, “we have to accept the reality that Hong 
Kong is a free port, and offers a lot of opportunities for this kind of activity to happen. Every day, 
we have tens of thousands of cargoes going in and going out of the city.”198 
Africa accounts for a smaller portion of the global seizure weight, with Asian nations 
Singapore and South Korea the most prominent transit countries (Table 6). Singapore was 
associated with 53% of seized weight in its role as a transit country. Uganda, Cameroon, and 
Congo were the top three implicated transit countries. Notably, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Uganda 
were among both the top origin and transit countries.  
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Table 6. Top transit countries. Adapted from Wildlife Justice Commission Table 7 “Transit 
countries and total attributed weight (2016-2019).” 
Country/Territory 2016 (kg) 2017 (kg) 2018 (kg) 2019 (kg) Total (kg) 
Singapore - - 3,800 41,513 45,313 
South Korea - - - 10,650 10,650 
Uganda - 6,000 - - 6,000 
Thailand 5,800 - - - 5,800 
Malaysia - 5,000 - - 5,000 
Turkey 2,900 - - 1,200 4,100 
Vietnam - - 3,300 - 3,300 
Cameroon - - 2,518 - 2,518 
Republic of Congo - - 1,800 - 1,800 
Nigeria - - 718 - 718 
Kenya 500 - - - 500 
Preferred Methods of Trafficking 
Nigeria, Uganda, and DRC are considered logistical hubs for a wide range of trafficked 
wildlife species.199 It is not uncommon for multiple species of wildlife to be smuggled together, 
particularly ivory, rhino horn, and pangolin, and transnational crime organizations rarely specialize 
in one species. In 2017-2018, the joint smuggling of ivory and pangolin scales tripled in volume, 
with scales comprising a greater portion of the shipment than ivory in many cases and illustrating 
an increased emphasis by these organizations to traffic pangolins.200 
Pangolins, similar to other wildlife species, are trafficked along with other non-wildlife 
commodities, which are often legal and provide cover for illegal activity. The most common of 
these commodities are plastic waste, beans, nuts, seeds, frozen meat, ginger, and timber – which 
in itself represents a thriving illegal trade and environmental crisis.201 In these mixed shipments, 
pangolins have also been seized while trafficked alongside ivory, rhino horn, bear paws, hornbill 
beaks, hippopotamus teeth (which acts as a substitute for elephant ivory), insects, big cats and their 
parts, reptiles, and various types of bushmeat.202 
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During the 2010-2015 study period, pangolin trafficking was primarily by air. Traffickers 
on planes have used multiple methods, such as using missing, incomplete or fraudulent 
documentation, declaring pangolins as fish, wigs, feathers, etc., and hiding pangolins within meat, 
fish, fruit, or vegetables.203 Although this was the primary method of trafficking, air seizures began 
to decline in 2016 (Table 7). Trafficking by sea became the main method of smuggling pangolin 
scales from 2016-2019, partly due to the drastic increase in shipment size over time. Pangolin 
scales are also moved by land, though appear less frequently in the seizure data than trafficking by 
sea or air. 
Table 7. Primary trafficking methods. Adapted from Wildlife Justice Commission Table 11 
“Mode of Transport recorded for pangolin scales shipments (2016-2019).” 
Transport Mode 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total 
Sea 5 5 8 10 28 
Air 6 - 2 1 10 
Premises - 1 6 - 6 
Land vehicle - 2 1 2 5 
Unknown - 1 2 - 3 
Total 11 9 19 13 52 
Trafficking to Destination Countries 
Destination countries are defined as the “intended destination of a trafficking instance.”204 
From 2007-2018, approximately 71% of pangolin seizures were destined for China, with 19% 
destined for Vietnam. China was the primary endpoint for pangolin trafficking activity until 2018 
when it was surpassed by Vietnam, which was associated with 80% of large quantity pangolin 
seizures in 2019 (Table 8). 
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Table 8. Primary destination countries. Adapted from Wildlife Justice Commission Table 8 
“Countries of destination and total attributed weight (2016-2019).” 
Country/Territory 2016 (kg) 2017 (kg) 2018 (kg) 2019 (kg) Total (kg) 
Vietnam - - 13,331 49,873 63,204 
China - 18,458 14,360 10,650 43,468 
Lao PDR 6,300 - - - 6,300 
Cambodia - - 3,300 - 3,300 
Nigeria - 1,050 1,800 - 2,850 
Romania - - - 1,200 1,200 
Malaysia 670 - - - 670 
 
Although Vietnam and China are both CITES member Parties that legislatively comply 
with the rule for domestic implementation of international pangolin trade limitations, pangolin sale 
and consumption remains common in both countries.205 
Vietnam 
Vietnam holds an interesting position as both a country with high demand for pangolins 
and also as a smuggling hub into China, similar to Hong Kong SAR.  
In 2018, USAID and GlobeScan conducted a joint study assessing demand for elephant, 
rhino, and pangolin products in Vietnam, surveying consumers in five Vietnamese cities, including 
Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City. In the survey, respondents stated that pangolins in Vietnam are 
valued as common products, where scales and meat are used for traditional medicine and 
consumption, as gifts, typically in close familial or friendship bonds, and are readily available for 
purchase at traditional medicine outlets and restaurants.206 In purchasing decisions, scales 
represented 37% of pangolin parts purchased by survey respondents, followed by powder, meat, 
and whole pangolins. In Ha Noi, scales were the most purchased item (57% of all items purchased), 
while in Ho Chi Minh City, powder was the most purchased pangolin derivative (42%). The 
authors of the report conclude that Vietnamese buyers consider pangolins to be appropriate for 
many basic health needs, inexpensive and easy to buy, and that consumers’ beliefs in pangolins 
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effectiveness is passed down from older to younger generations and is influenced by Chinese 
culture.207 
Vietnam also acts as a transit point for pangolins destined for China. In their social media 
analysis from 2008-2016, Cheng et al. identified Vietnam as the largest origin country (start of 
wildlife shipment) for pangolins later seized in China.208 After researchers combed through local 
media reports on pangolin seizures made from 2011-2019, a land route from Laos, through 
Vietnam, and into China was identified as a commonly used avenue for pangolin trafficking.209 
Although the focus of most pangolin conservation effort is on China, as a demand country that 
also operates as a key node along the pangolin trafficking supply chain, Vietnam is a significant 
actor to address alongside China in pangolin conservation action. 
China 
China remains a major destination for pangolins and their products. In the TRAFFIC study 
of pangolin shipments from 2010-2015, China was the primary destination for large quantity 
shipments of both pangolin scales and whole animals. In the WJC 2016-2019 study, China was 
the destination for 34% of pangolin scale activity. Despite its efforts to pass and implement 
domestic legislation to protect pangolins, China remains a prominent end destination for smuggled 
pangolins converted into TCM or consumed in restaurants (detailed in Chapter Two). 
PART TWO: BRI INFLUENCES ON GLOBAL PANGOLIN TRAFFICKING 
Research Questions 
To evaluate the role of BRI in the existing Africa to Asia pangolin trafficking supply chain, 
this study asks two research questions: 1) How has BRI influenced trafficking of African 
pangolins? and 2) How might BRI influence African pangolin trafficking in the future? 
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Question 1: How has BRI Influenced Trafficking of African Pangolins? 
President Xi announced BRI to the world in 2013. In the same year, pangolin seizure data 
reflected the shift from poaching Asian pangolins to trafficking African pangolins into Asia.210 
Nigeria eclipses other African nations in terms of its role in the pangolin trafficking supply chain. 
For the purpose of this study, I review the relationship between China and Nigeria through BRI in 
order to determine the impact of BRI on African pangolin trafficking. 
Nigeria’s Role in the Pangolin Trafficking Supply Chain 
According to the data provided by the TRAFFIC and WJC assessments, Nigeria is a major 
player in the international pangolin trafficking supply chain and has risen to prominence in recent 
years. Nigeria was the only African nation implicated as one of the top countries by weight from 
2010 to 2015, connected to 11% of all seized pangolin scale shipments during that time period.211 
From 2016 to 2019, Nigeria became the top country globally, by total weight seized, and was 
associated with 28% of all scale shipments – China and Vietnam were associated with 18% and 
13% respectively.212  
Nigeria was also listed among the top origin, transit, and destination countries trafficking 
pangolins between 2016 and 2019. Nigeria was the top origin country, associated with 63% of all 
trafficked scales by weight, the 10th ranked transit country and 3rd African country behind 
Cameroon and Congo, and the 5th ranked destination country and only African nation listed.213  
Nigeria is home to three of the four African pangolin species – the white-bellied pangolin 
(P. tricuspis), the black-bellied pangolin (P. tetradactyla), and the giant ground pangolin (S. 
gigantea). The ranges of these species overlap with several of Nigeria’s geographic neighbors, 
which provide additional pangolins to source for the illegal trade. 
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Per the IUCN SSC Pangolin Specialist Group 2016 assessment, Nigeria affords full 
domestic protection to its three pangolin species through the Endangered Species (Control of 
International Trade and Traffic) Act of 1985.214 Internationally, Nigeria was one of the first nations 
to ratify CITES, which entered into force on 7 January 1975.215 In preparation for the 2016 
Appendix I CITES listing of all eight pangolin species, Nigeria was cooperative with the CITES 
Secretariat. Nigeria was one of twenty African range states that sent in a questionnaire detailing 
the conservation status of their pangolin species, reporting population declines and pangolin 
seizures in the country.216 
In October 2018, the CITES Secretariat issued a recommendation to suspend trade with 
Nigeria for an endangered species of tree (Pterocarpus erinaceus) due to issues with compliance 
and enforcement, but no other CITES-based trade restriction recommendations have been given 
despite Nigeria’s growing role in wildlife trafficking.217 
Despite both domestic and international protections for Nigeria’s pangolins, the sheer 
volume of pangolins shipped from within its borders as part of the pangolin trafficking supply 
chain suggest that current efforts are inefficient. The UNODC warned in March 2019 that Nigeria 
“might risk [evolving] into a transit hub for illicit wildlife products, including pangolins, elephant 
tusks and other protected species.”218 Conservation enforcement is hindered by several factors, 
including governmental corruption, security challenges from Boko Haram in the northeast, and 
limited penalties for wildlife crime offenses, all of which present a bleak outlook for future 
conservation action to protect pangolins and other trafficked species.219 
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Nigeria and China 
Nigeria and China’s diplomatic relationship began on 1 February 1971 when Nigeria 
formally recognized the People’s Republic of China (Appendix I).220  
In the following years, China strengthened its economic ties with Nigeria, which is the 
most populous country in Africa with a large market for China-made products and has significant 
oil resources. China’s aim of engaging with Africa in part due to mineral access is illustrated in 
Nigeria, with China investing $4.8 billion (out of $7.5 billion total to Sub-Saharan Africa) in 
Nigerian oil from 2001-2007.221 From 2008-2010, Nigeria – along with Angola and Sudan – were 
among China’s top trading partners.222  
As of 2017, Nigeria and China had continued their economic relationship, with China 
accounting for 21% of imports to Nigeria (ahead of Belgium 9%, United States 8%, South Korea 
7%, and United Kingdom 4%) and Nigeria exporting 6% of its goods to China (behind India 31%, 
United States 12%, and Spain 7%).223 According to Zhao Yong, the Charge d’Affaires of the 
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Nigeria, trade volume between Nigeria and China 
was USD$15.3 billion in 2018, a 10% increase from 2017 levels.224 In addition to trade in goods, 
Chinese human capital in Nigeria has also grown in recent years. From 2012-2014, 8,057 Chinese 
workers were employed in Nigeria, which rose to 9,257 workers from 2015-2017 (Figure 8). 
Financial ties between Nigeria and China have also increased. From 2015-2017, China granted 
USD$422 million in loans annually to Nigeria (Table 1), which was well below the average for 
the whole of Africa. However, in 2018, the People’s Bank of China signed a USD$2.5 billion 
three-year currency swap deal with the Central Bank of Nigeria, further strengthening Nigeria and 
China’s financial ties.225 
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Public opinion of China in Nigeria is favorable to China. In 2019, the Pew Research Center 
conducted a survey of Nigerian citizens which found that 83% of respondents believe China’s 
growing economy is a net positive for Nigeria and 82% of respondents said Chinese investment is 
good for their country due to its potential for job creation.226 This overall favorable impression of 
China reinforces China’s goals of increased engagement with Nigeria and has provided fertile 
ground for BRI to flourish in West Africa. 
BRI and Nigeria’s Pangolin Trafficking Problem 
The date Nigeria joined the Belt and Road Initiative is disputed depending on the source, 
and is anywhere from late 2018 to February 2019. Adding to the lack of clarity is that there is no 
official and publicly available list of BRI projects from the CPC or Nigerian government. Of the 
several infrastructure projects referred to as under the “BRI in Nigeria” umbrella include multiple 
standard gauge rail lines (Abuja-Kaduna, Lagos-Ibadan) and a mass transit system (in Abuja, the 
capital of Nigeria), as well as two international airports (Malam Aminu Kano International Airport 
in Kano and a new terminal at Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport in Abuja), satellites 
(Nigcomsat satellites), and Lekki deep sea port project.227 
The two major standard gauge rail lines (Abuja-Kaduna, Lagos-Ibadan) both began prior 
to the start of the ‘official’ BRI relationship. The Abuja-Kaduna rail service opened in 2016 and 
provides transportation between the capital and industrial city of Kaduna.228 The Lagos-Ibadan 
railway was funded in 2012 by the China Export-Import Bank via USD$1.53 billion in 
concessional loans and was under construction from 2015-2019.229 The project was constructed 
by the China Civil Engineering Construction Company to transport freight and passengers.230  
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For the purpose of this study, it is not possible to say with certainty that BRI has an 
influence on pangolin trafficking in Nigeria. The inconsistency of BRI start dates, as well as a 
paucity of intra-Nigeria data on pangolin trafficking makes it highly difficult to determine whether 
or not BRI can be credited with the uptick in Nigeria’s role in the pangolin trafficking supply chain 
over the last decade. That is part of the challenge in analyzing an illicit trade – we only know about 
the least successful cases and seizure data provides trend analysis but a still limited view of the 
entire system. However, Nigeria may illustrate BRI’s role as one of many drivers which facilitate 
pangolin trafficking across Nigeria’s borders which may be analyzed in the future. 
Question 2: How Might BRI Influence African Pangolin Trafficking in the Future? 
BRI is one of many drivers of pangolin exploitation, which need to be addressed by both 
members of the conservation community and the nation states committed to stopping the illegal 
trade. These include customs enforcement, governmental corruption, and the security outlook. 
Within the existing wildlife conservation environment, BRI is an additional driver that places 
pressure on efforts to protect African pangolins in several ways. 
Economic and infrastructure connectivity enables illegal trade. For a range of plant and 
animal species, environmental exploitation such as logging, agribusiness, mining, and drilling 
bring humans into closer contact with previously unaffected wildlife and make wildlife and plant 
products much easier to move. With construction and development, existing barriers to trade will 
be further reduced, which will open up new corridors for illicit activity and present new challenges 
for law enforcement. Lastly, the physical construction of projects will not only lead to habitat 
degradation and loss, which will have a direct impact on pangolins and other valuable wildlife 
species, but will facilitate the poaching and smuggling of pangolins through the creation of new 
physical trafficking networks. 
An increasing human resource presence in China may lead to small-scale trafficking 
activity. On several occasions, Chinese nationals have been caught smuggling endangered species 
from Africa back to China.231 Although this is unlikely to be a significant problem compared to 
the large quantity scale shipments becoming more prevalent and that are the focus of this study, 
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the movement of Chinese workers to African nations with BRI projects may present an avenue for 
small-scale trafficking activity. In 2014, a business delegation accompanying President Xi to 
Tanzania was implicated in the illegal purchase of thousands of kilograms of elephant ivory with 
the purchase of offloading it when they returned to China.232 Later in 2017, two Chinese diplomats 
were accused of collaborating with officials in Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, and 
South Sudan to acquire illegal ivory and return to sell it in China.233 For their part, officials in the 
Chinese government have been vocal about the harm this may do to China’s image in Africa. After 
the 2014 allegation, China’s foreign ministry decried the “bad habits” and unlawful behavior of its 
citizens,234 and China has collaborated with World Wildlife Fund to educate their citizenry on the 
perils of engaging in wildlife trafficking while abroad in Africa.235 The cynical view, however, is 
that in these efforts China has focused more on ensuring their citizens don’t break laws 
internationally and cast a poor reflection on their country, rather than discouraging wildlife crime 
in Africa because of its conservation merit. This view is further reinforced by the CPC’s allowance 
of illegal pangolin restaurant consumption and the loopholes for using pangolins in TCM, 
discussed in Chapter Two. 
With China’s increasing engagement on the African continent, there is a higher potential 
for pangolin trafficking from African range states to Asian demand countries, notably Vietnam 
and China. Reviewing BRI countries and their roles in the global pangolin trafficking supply chain 
over the next five years will be essential to ensuring the survival of African pangolins. 
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PART THREE: CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
It is likely that BRI may enable trafficking of African pangolins, through increased 
connectivity and a growing role of China on the African continent. According to Dan Challender, 
one of the foremost experts on pangolin conservation, “The decline of Asian pangolin populations, 
and crucially, the increasing economic and development ties between East Asia and many African 
countries in recent years has resulted in a growing illegal trade in African pangolin parts to Asian 
markets.”236  
According to the analysis provided by the Green Belt and Road Initiative Center,237 
analysis derived from Chinese government sources, 43 of the 54 countries in Africa have signed 
BRI agreements (Appendix 1). Although this number is not independently corroborated from 
African governments, it is undeniable that China is acting to expand its influence and connectivity 
on the African continent. In Sub-Saharan Africa, only Central African Republic, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, eSwatini (which is the sole African nation without diplomatic relations 
with the PRC), Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Niger, and São Tomé and Príncipe are not considered BRI 
partner countries. In the 2017 TRAFFIC analysis, all 11 African pangolin origin countries are 
involved in BRI. Of the 11 origin countries highlighted in the 2020 WJC report, all but Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Central African Republic are BRI partner countries. Nigeria was the 
prominent African country in terms of both transit and destination roles within the pangolin 
trafficking supply chain, and has been a BRI country since 2018/2019. The continued development 
of trade routes between Africa and Asia, as well as infrastructure construction bringing humans 
and wildlife into closer contact, suggest that BRI can act to exacerbate the pangolin trafficking 
supply chain. 
The specific role of BRI in African countries, particularly pangolin range states and those 
otherwise implicated in the illegal trade of pangolins, is one that should be followed in the coming 
years. There is little reason to believe that as China expands their influence in Africa and continues 
 
236 Challender, Daniel W.S., Baillie, Jonathan E. M., Waterman, Carly, Pietersen, Darren W., Nash, Helen, Leanne  
Wicker, Keri Parker, et al. “On Scaling Up Pangolin Conservation.” TRAFFIC Bulletin 28, no. 1 (2016). 
https://www.pangolinsg.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/06/Challender-et-al_2016_On-Scaling-Up-
Pangolin-Conservation.pdf.  
237 The Green Belt and Road Initiative Center. “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).” n.d.  
https://green-bri.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri. 
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to develop economic corridors into Africa through BRI that this will not lead to increased pangolin 
exploitation.  
The Role of COVID-19 on Pangolin Supply 
Unlike the impact of COVID-19 on pangolin demand, the conservation community has an 
idea of the role COVID-19 has played on wildlife trafficking supply chains. COVID-19 has 
temporarily shifted the activities of transnational crime organizations engaging in wildlife 
trafficking, as countries along the wildlife trafficking supply chain from Sub-Saharan Africa into 
Southeast Asia and China have instituted national lockdowns, quarantines, and international border 
restrictions. This has resulted in increased poaching activity but decreased capacity for traffickers 
to move their product across international borders. This pattern is typical for a wide variety of 
trafficked wildlife species, including rhinoceros, elephant, and pangolin.  
In response to COVID-19, countries along the wildlife trafficking supply chain from Sub-
Saharan Africa into Southeast Asia and China have tightened border constraints. Poaching activity 
in former tourist hotspots and previously safe regions for wildlife spiked in the immediate 
aftermath of Sub-Saharan African nations closing their borders. This was particularly stark in 
southern Africa, where nine rhinos were killed in South Africa’s North West Province and six 
rhinos in Botswana in the two weeks following both countries’ closures.238 National lockdowns 
included the cessation of tourist activity in parks, which had a compounded effect of reducing the 
human presence in these areas and cutting off park income used to pay ranger staff who protect 
wildlife within park borders.  
The role of border closures on pangolin trafficking in particular is more difficult to 
measure, as rhinos tend to be well-guarded on national parks and conservancies and their loss is 
more noticeable than pangolins. Pangolins are secretive by nature and conservationists are 
uncertain of their exact populations, with no studies measuring pangolin poaching post-COVID-
19 published to date. Per a WJC rapid assessment of COVID-19 and wildlife trafficking, the 1 
February 2020 closure of the China-Vietnam border has led traffickers to create large stockpiles 
 
238 Roth, Annie. “Poachers kill more rhinos as coronavirus halts tourism to Africa.” The New York Times, April 8, 
2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/science/coronavirus-poaching-rhinos.html.  
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in Vietnam of ivory and pangolin products initially destined for China.239 Raw ivory is being 
stockpiled in Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Cambodia as well.240 Multiple Southeast Asian nations’ 
COVID-19 responses have hampered traditional avenues for trafficking wildlife products via air, 
ship, and road (Figure 10), including land routes used by pangolin smugglers attempting to move 
pangolin products through Vietnam into China. From January to April 2020, “several Vietnamese 
traders expressed difficulties with smuggling wildlife into China due to extended border checks 
and travel restrictions and spoke [to WJC] of their desperation to offload large quantities of stock, 
often at discounted prices.”241 Anecdotally, Wildlife Justice Commission operatives were offered 
over 22 tons of pangolin scales for sale in Vietnam from January to March 2020 when COVID-19 
was ramping up.242 
 
 
239 Wildlife Justice Commission. “Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Wildlife Trafficking.” Wildlife 







Figure 10. COVID-19 barriers to wildlife trafficking.  
Image courtesy of the Wildlife Justice Commission.243 
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Unfortunately for pangolins, it is likely that wildlife traffickers will utilize their growing 
stockpiles of poached wildlife and resume international trafficking at a higher level than before 
the onset of COVID-19 once border restrictions are lifted along key nodes in the Africa to Asia 
supply chain. Multiple wildlife seizures in March and April 2020, including the seizure of 441 kg 
of pangolin scales in China in from Vietnam on 1 April 2020, indicate that the pangolin trafficking 
supply chain is still attempting to run as normal and will resume when the threat of COVID-19 has 
passed. 
Data Gaps and Areas for Future Research 
Thematically, there is a link between BRI on the African continent and pangolin 
trafficking. Lack of data is severely hampering the conservation community’s ability to answer 
this question. Conducting this study, on a larger and more holistic scale, would be a worthwhile 
endeavor in understanding the exact mechanisms of pangolin trafficking in African BRI partner 
states, and may also shed light on the combined trafficking of pangolin and elephant products from 
Africa to Asia. There are several remaining data gaps to be filled: 
Seizures per country per year. Although the TRAFFIC and WJC reports are highly 
informative, for the purposes of identifying country-level trends per year – as would be most 
effective in assessing the impact of BRI on pangolin trafficking – these reports only provide data 
in consolidated forms of multiple year increments. An assessment at the country level with the 
base data used by the authors of the TRAFFIC and WJC reports would allow for a statistically 
powerful quantitative assessment. Utilizing the base data would also allow researchers to 
streamline the “large quantity seizure” metric. TRAFFIC considered seizures over 1,000 kg to be 
large-scale, while WJC reduced this threshold to 500 kg. Using the same metric, by year, would 
allow researchers to identify country-level trends in pangolin seizure data and, if using the 500 kg 
metric, would increase the sample size and yield a more accurate picture of the global pangolin 
trafficking supply chain. 
Seizure data for small quantity events. Through using the TRAFFIC and WJC studies, 
information on small quantity events (less than 1,000 kg for TRAFFIC and less than 500 kg for 
WJC) is unavailable. TRAFFIC’s Wildlife Trade Portal online dataset, available at 
www.wildlifetradeportal.org, provides some insight into small scale trafficking seizures but a 
holistic assessment of small quantity events currently does not exist. This limitation is partly due 
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to the inconsistency with which countries report seizure event data, but is also a result of the need 
for the conservation and law enforcement communities to prioritize their attention and limited 
resources on large scale trafficking. For the purposes of understanding BRI and trafficking, 
interpreting the volume of small scale trafficking events by Chinese nationals traveling between 
mainland China and BRI participant countries is essential.  
Pangolin poaching hotspots, within a country and at the national level. The primary data 
source for pangolin poaching events is identifying the country listed as an origin country on a 
seized wildlife product manifest. Forgery, money laundering, and other white-collar crimes 
coincide with wildlife trafficking, making manifests not wholly reliable. Promising studies with 
African elephant ivory, including placing a GPS tracker into a tusk and following it through the 
supply chain244 and DNA sampling seized tusks to identify origin points,245 create potential 
avenues to replicate with pangolins. One attempt to collate data from park rangers for more 
efficient patrols is the SMART (Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool) system, with data analysis 
by a consortium of wildlife conservation agencies including Wildlife Conservation Society and 
World Wildlife Fund.246  
Despite promising projects like SMART, data remain the major limitation in terms of 
understanding the pangolin trafficking supply chain and leaves us with only general trends and 
impacts to assess as a result. Future research to address any of the above data limitations would 
help the conservation community learn more about the constantly evolving nature of pangolin 
trafficking. Another action that the conservation community can take to address data limitations is 
to consolidate data across organizations and make it publicly available. Data in the conservation 
community tends to be very well-guarded. In their reports, both TRAFFIC and WJC built their 
own data sets, which incorporated many disparate sources. Although the TRAFFIC Wildlife Trade 
Portal is publicly available for those granted access, it remains incomplete compared to the 
independent assessments by TRAFFIC and WJC in their own reports. Similarly, the United 
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime manages their World WISE database, tracking wildlife seizure 
 
244 Christy, Bryan. “How Killing Elephants Finances Terror in Africa.” National Geographic, August 12, 2015. 
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3, 2015): 84–87. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa2457.  




events globally. Cooperation between NGOs and IGOs working in this space would allow 
conservation agencies, independent researchers, and law enforcement to develop the most 
complete picture of pangolin trafficking. Duplication of effort wastes time that pangolins do not 
have. 
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Chapter Four: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
KEY FINDINGS 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has the potential to negatively affect both demand and 
supply of African pangolins. Awareness of how BRI influence demand and supply of African 
pangolins is important for groups and nations interested in conserving pangolins. 
Scales are in demand for use in TCM, while meat is in demand for restaurant consumption. 
TCM is likely to become more prominent as a result of BRI, through President Xi’s promotion of 
the practice abroad, China’s pharmaceutical export industry, and its connection to the Chinese 
identity and BRI. This will place additional pressure on African pangolins, which will only be 
alleviated through demand reduction strategies and enforcement of recent rule changes removing 
pangolins from the Chinese Pharmacopoeia. BRI may also lead to increased pangolin trafficking 
in the future, due to the increased connectivity and infrastructure, developing economic 
connections, and Chinese presence in African BRI partner countries. In terms of supply, BRI is 
difficult to separate out from other drivers of pangolin trafficking, but it is highly likely that BRI 
in the future may have a detrimental impact on African pangolin conservation if BRI’s influences 
on pangolin demand and supply are left unaddressed. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Due to the highly complex nature of pangolin conservation, both as a subject and 
geographically, there are many stakeholders with varying levels of involvement trying to address 
this issue. At the national level, this includes pangolin range states, African BRI partner countries, 
and China. At the international level, intergovernmental organizations including INTERPOL, 
CITES, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the United Nations General 
Assembly, and the African Union all have a stake in pangolin conservation and regional issues. 
Many nongovernmental organizations are also involved, most notably TRAFFIC, World Wildlife 
Fund, and the Wildlife Justice Commission. Members of the larger conservation community and 
academia also have an interest in conserving African pangolins. 
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United States Policy Recommendations 
For the purpose of this study, I focus on the United States as an important actor for several 
reasons. First, the United States has a vested interest in protecting wildlife. Through membership 
in CITES, federal emphasis on wildlife conservation via the 2014 National Strategy for Combating 
Wildlife Trafficking247 and the END Wildlife Trafficking Act,248 the United States has stated a 
commitment to wildlife conservation. Secondly, China as a rising great power is of paramount 
importance to United States foreign policy, and the U.S. sees BRI as a tool to expand China’s soft 
power globally, promoting China’s authoritarian model while pushing the U.S. out. With China as 
a great power competitor, pangolin conservation – an area otherwise likely considered of little 
importance amidst the COVID-19 pandemic its subsequent global economic crisis – may provide 
a window for United States engagement that can address our relationship with both wildlife and 
China at the same time. The policy recommendations for the United States are as follows: 
Executive Branch 
1. Promote demand reduction. Per the 2017 TRAFFIC report, the U.S. is a demand market 
for pangolins. Although the U.S. domestic market is smaller and less influential than those 
in China and Vietnam, addressing the United States’ role as a demand country in its own 
right is important to larger pangolin conservation efforts. Demand reduction efforts, 
through U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service public awareness campaigns, as well as grant 
funding to NGOs working on this issue at home and in high-demand areas, are essential to 
protecting pangolins and slowing the illegal wildlife trade. Demand reduction strategies, in 
order to be effective, must both select an effective spokesperson and message and blanket 
“stop pangolin consumption” campaigns may be ineffective if these factors are not taken 
into consideration. 
2. Include all eight species of pangolin under the Endangered Species Act listing. The current 
iteration of the Endangered Species Act includes only one species: the Temminck’s ground 
pangolin (S. temminckii) and prohibits the ‘take’ (ie. harm, capture, kill) of this species in 
 
247 Obama, Barack. National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking (2014). 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nationalstrategywildlifetrafficking.pdf.  
248 Rep. Royce, Edward R. [R-CA-39] (sponsor). Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016, 
Pub. L. No. Public Law No: 114-231, H.R.2494 (2016). https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/house-bill/2494.  
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the United States. A major challenge of enforcement, and reason why CITES member 
Parties – including the United States – uplisted all eight species to Appendix I is that 
individual species are very difficult to differentiate from each other. One pangolin species 
protected while the others are not increases the likelihood of enforcement mistakes and 
helps launder pangolins illegally into and within the United States. All eight species’ 
populations are declining and would benefit from protection under the Endangered Species 
Act. Although the U.S. is a much smaller demand market for pangolins, listing under the 
ESA is a relatively straight forward action that can have a positive impact for pangolins in 
the United States. 
3. Emphasize Nigeria, China, and Singapore to be countries of concern in Department of 
State’s annual END Wildlife Trafficking report. This designation directs the Department 
of State, through the END Wildlife Trafficking Act, to assist these countries in designing 
and implementing an anti-wildlife-trafficking infrastructure in order to combat wildlife 
trafficking within and across their borders. 
4. Address myriad data gaps. Agencies in the Executive Branch, namely U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service and members of the Intelligence Community, are perfectly placed to fill 
the large number of data gaps, ranging from pangolin demand to China’s BRI projects and 
trafficking activity. Additional support to these agencies for projects focusing on pangolin 
trafficking in particular would benefit pangolins, but also positively influence many other 
species of wildlife and the security and economic consequences of the larger international 
wildlife trafficking problem. 
5. Continue interagency collaboration. Cooperation between U.S. Fish and Wildlife, the 
Department of Justice, the Department of State, the Department of Treasury, and the 
Intelligence Community is essential to combatting pangolin trafficking, and wildlife 
trafficking on the whole. A strong interagency process, led within the Department of the 
Interior, would minimize duplication of effort and streamline government actions in 
countering wildlife trafficking. 
Legislative Branch 
1. Amend the Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016 (H.R.2494) 
to require the Department of State to submit its annual report and strategic for an 
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additional five years. The annual report by the Department of State requires the agency to 
identify focus countries and countries of concern and integrate wildlife trafficking 
intervention into programmatic work at overseas U.S. missions in these countries. The 
reporting requirement will end in 2021. 
China Policy Recommendations 
China has several avenues with which it can act to protect pangolins, if it is truly serious 
about doing so.  
Firstly, closing the Wildlife Protection Law loophole that allows pangolins to be sourced 
from government stockpiles and completely removing the remaining pangolins from the Chinese 
Pharmacopoeia – both as raw materials and ingredients in patented medicines – would help to 
reduce both demand and supply pressures on pangolins.  
Secondly, while promoting the use of TCM abroad, representatives of the Chinese 
government should emphasize that it is the position of the government that pangolins should be 
protected and discourage the use of pangolin-based TCM products. This is particularly important 
in terms of pharmaceutical exports and practitioners at TCM centers. As an added measure, the 
Chinese government could issue public warnings and instructions for travelers at key travel nodes, 
particularly airports, specifically regarding the illegality of pangolin consumption. 
Thirdly, China should re-evaluate its attitude toward restaurant consumption. Although 
pangolins are utilized primarily for their scales in TCM, restaurant demand for their meat is a 
notable driver of pangolin exploitation. Tightening enforcement and penalties for restaurants that 
provide illegal pangolins for their customers may help to close this enforcement gap. 
Lastly, demand reduction is an important part of the conservation puzzle, particularly when 
done in concert with enforcement strategies. Government action to promote demand reduction may 
be more effective than independent campaigns by NGOs, and is worth investigating, particularly 
in terms of making the intellectual connection between wildlife markets and subsequent public 
health crises like COVID-19. Determining the appropriate message and communicator for this 
message is crucial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Pangolins are in danger of going extinct before many in the world learn of their existence. 
Demand for Traditional Chinese Medicine and the massive pangolin trafficking supply chain are 
placing immense pressure on pangolin populations across Asia and Africa. African pangolins have 
experienced staggering levels of poaching in the last decade and China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
places another strain on a family of species that were already barely holding on. 
For the United States, pangolin conservation represents an opportunity to engage China at 
an intersection of several different policy areas: conservation, environment, security, foreign 
policy, and economics. As a result, addressing pangolin conservation through the lens of BRI’s 
impact on pangolins allows government actors, such as the United States, to simultaneously 
address a growing wildlife conservation issue while meeting other policy goals. 
In a more liberal form of international engagement, the United States could utilize the issue 
of pangolin conservation to find common ground with China on an issue that President Xi has 
signaled interest in confronting. Through his promotion of wildlife conservation and anti-opulence 
campaign, President Xi has a history of pushing for domestic legislation in favor of wildlife 
conservation issues and in the past China has bowed to international pressure in this space – most 
recently with the domestic ban on elephant ivory. The key problem, both for China and external 
international actors such as the U.S. engaging in wildlife conservation issues, is domestic 
enforcement in China. As of August 2020, China is in agreement with CITES ban on international 
trade of pangolins via the Wildlife Protection Law, yet the TCM loophole in the Wildlife Protection 
Law combined with the incomplete removal of pangolins from the Chinese Pharmacopoeia, show 
that China is not as fully committed to protecting pangolins as they appear at first glance. In an era 
where the United States had international credibility in environmental and conservation policy, the 
U.S. could work alongside Western allies and those in Southeast Asia to encourage China to 
recognize that promoting pangolin conservation and sustainable use of wildlife is in the country’s 
best interest and would give the PRC a prominent seat at the table on global wildlife conservation 
issues. 
However, this view of the U.S. as an environmental leader and liberal idea of the United 
States and China relationship is growing increasingly distant from the current reality. The Trump 
Administration’s “trade war” with China set a more combative than collaborative tone for working 
with China on an issue like wildlife conservation. The United States and its Western allies became 
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more vocally critical of China as a result of its persecution of the Uighur Muslim minority 
population, attempts to stifle the “one country two systems” sovereignty of Hong Kong, and most 
recent initial coverup of the spread of the COVID-19 epidemic within their borders. Although the 
United States’ opposition to China was initially unilateral, these recent actions by China may 
provide an impetus for U.S. allies to reexamine their posture toward the PRC and open the door 
for collaboration with the U.S. against China on a range of issues, not least wildlife conservation. 
In this environment, Western engagement with the PRC may be less focused on working 
collaboratively with China and nations along the pangolin trafficking supply chain to fix the 
problem and more into pressuring President Xi and the CPC to address its role in facilitating the 
ongoing pangolin conservation crisis. COVID-19 provided a window of opportunity for the United 
States to pressure China to close its wet markets. In an April 2020 statement, Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo urged the PRC to close its wet markets. In May, Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) and 
Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), along with World Wildlife Fund President and CEO Carter 
Roberts issued a joint call to close wet markets that “sell high-risk wildlife for human 
consumption.”249 While wildlife conservation does not appear to be a high priority issue under the 
current U.S. administration, and is being actively discouraged through efforts to relax big game 
hunting bans and dismantle the Endangered Species Act, President Trump may seize the 
opportunity to ban wildlife product imports, including TCM products, from China as a way of 
folding wildlife conservation into the “trade war” and pushing against China regarding a practice 
central to the Chinese identity.  
China’s role as the source of the COVID-19 pandemic has added another layer of 
complication to the relationship between China and the rest of the world, and it is uncertain what 
priority, if any, addressing pangolin conservation will have in the global pandemic response. As 
the international community focuses on the pandemic, pangolins continue to be exploited to meet 
demand in traditional medicine and are trafficked from range states in Africa into Asia at alarming 
rates. The linkage between pangolins – and trafficked wildlife – and the COVID-19 pandemic is 
still being explored, but if the illegal wildlife trade of pangolins to meet demand in Asia is left 
unchecked, it is likely that pangolin populations will continue to plummet and illegal wildlife will 
be the source of the next global pandemic.
 
249 Coons, Chris, Lindsey Graham, and Carter Roberts. “How to Stop the Next Pandemic.” Politico, May 15, 2020. 
https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2020/05/15/how-to-stop-the-next-pandemic-260946.  
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Appendix: Diplomatic and Economic Relations between China and African 
Nations 
 







(as of March 
2020)252 
Algeria 20 December 1958 Yes 2018 
Angola 12 January 1983 Yes 2018 
Benin 12 November 1964 Yes Unconfirmed 
Botswana 6 January 1975 No None 
Burkina Faso 15 September 1973 No None 
Burundi 21 December 1963 Yes 2018 
Cameroon 26 March 1971 Yes 2015 
Cape Verde 25 April 1976 Yes 2018 
Central African Republic 29 September 1964 No None 
Chad 28 November 1972 Yes 2018 
Comoros 13 November 1975 Yes Unconfirmed 
Republic of Congo 22 February 1964 Yes Unconfirmed 
Côte d’Ivoire 2 March 1983 Yes 2017 
Djibouti 8 January 1979 Yes 2018 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
20 February 1961 No None 
Egypt 30 May 1956 Yes 2016 
Equatorial Guinea 15 October 1970 Yes 2019 
Eritrea 24 May 1993 Yes 2018 
eSwatini None* No None 
Ethiopia 24 November 1970 Yes 2018 
Gabon 20 April 1974 Yes 2018 
Gambia 14 December 1974 Yes 2019 
Ghana 5 July 1960 Yes 2018 
Guinea 14 October 1959 Yes 2018 
Guinea Bissau 15 March 1974 No None 
Kenya 14 December 1963 Yes 2017 
Lesotho 30 April 1983 Yes 2019 
Liberia 17 February 1977 Yes 2019 
Libya 9 August 1978 Yes 2018 
 
250 Shinn, David H., and Joshua Eisenman. China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 
251 Xinhua Silk Road Information Service. “Belt and Road FAQ: What are the Belt and Road Countries?” June 23, 
2020. https://en.imsilkroad.com/p/314398.html. 
252 The Green Belt and Road Initiative Center. “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).” n.d.  
https://green-bri.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri. 
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(as of March 
2020)255 
Madagascar 6 November 1972 Yes 2017 
Malawi 28 December 2007 No None 
Mali 25 October 1960 Yes 2019 
Mauritania 19 July 1965 Yes 2018 
Mauritius 15 April 1972 No None 
Morocco 1 November 1958 Yes 2017 
Mozambique 25 July 1975 Yes 2018 
Namibia 22 March 1990 Yes 2018 
Niger 20 July 1974 No None 
Nigeria 10 February 1971 Yes 2018 
Rwanda 12 November 1971 Yes 2018 
São Tomé and Príncipe 12 July 1975 No None 
Senegal 7 December 1971 Yes 2018 
Seychelles 30 June 1976 Yes 2018 
Sierra Leone 29 July 1971 Yes 2018 
Somalia 14 December 1960 Yes 2015 
South Africa 1 January 1998 Yes 2015 
South Sudan 9 July 2011 Yes 2018 
Sudan 4 February 1959 Yes 2018 
Tanzania 9 December 1961 Yes 2018 
Togo 19 September 1972 Yes 2018 
Tunisia 10 January 1964 Yes 2018 
Uganda 18 October 1962 Yes 2018 
Zambia 29 October 1964 Yes 2018 
Zimbabwe 18 April 1980 Yes 2018 
* eSwatini is the only African country that has not established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of 
China, due to their recognition of Taiwan.  
** BRI Member State distinction and year of signed MOU are sourced from Chinese government sources and not 




253 Shinn, David H., and Joshua Eisenman. China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 
254 Xinhua Silk Road Information Service. “Belt and Road FAQ: What are the Belt and Road Countries?” June 23, 
2020. https://en.imsilkroad.com/p/314398.html. 




Chapter One: Introduction to the Issue 
 
Actman, Jani. “Bug Smuggling Is Big Business.” National Geographic, September 5, 2019.  
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/2019/09/bug-smuggling-big-business/.  
 
Alberts, Elizabeth Claire. “Did China Really Ban the Pangolin Trade? Not Quite, Investors Say.” 
Mongabay. June 24, 2020. https://news.mongabay.com/2020/06/did-china-really-ban-the-
pangolin-trade-not-quite-investigators-say/. 
 
Belt and Road News Current Affairs Correspondent Africa. “Is Chinese Investment a Threat to 
Nigeria?” Belt and Road News, August 12, 2019. 
https://www.beltandroad.news/2019/08/12/is-chinese-investment-a-threat-to-nigeria/. 
 
Briggs, Helen. “Hope for Pangolins as Protection Boosted in China.” BBC News, June 10, 2020. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-52981804.  
 
Center for Biological Diversity, Humane Society International, The Humane Society of the United 
States, Born Free USA, and Natural Resources Defense Council (Plaintiffs). Complaint for 




Challender, Daniel W. S., Carly Waterman, and Jonathan E. M. Baillie. “Scaling Up Pangolin 
Conservation: IUCN SSC Pangolin Specialist Group Conservation Action Plan.” London, 
United Kingdom: Zoological Society of London, 2014. 
https://www.iucn.org/downloads/scaling_up_pangolin_conservation_280714_v4_1.pdf.  
 
Challender, D., Willcox, D.H.A., Panjang, E., Lim, N., Nash, H., Heinrich, S. & Chong, 
J. 2019. Manis javanica. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2019: 
e.T12763A123584856. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12763A123584856.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins 
text page 94. 
 
Challender, D., Wu, S., Kaspal, P., Khatiwada, A., Ghose, A., Ching-Min Sun, N., Mohapatra,  
R.K. & Laxmi Suwal, T. 2019. Manis pentadactyla (errata version published in 2020). The 
IUCN Red List of Threatened 
Species 2019:e.T12764A168392151. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12764A168392151.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020.; Image from Pangolins 
text page 54. 
 
Chatzky, Andrew, and James McBride. “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative.” CFR 




CITES. “What is CITES?” CITES, n.d. https://cites.org/eng/disc/what.php. 
 
CITES. “Full text.” CITES, n.d. https://cites.org/eng/disc/text.php.  
 
CITES. “How CITES Works.” CITES, n.d. https://cites.org/eng/disc/how.php.   
 
Costa, Jacopo. “Preliminary Report: Examining Wildlife Trafficking Networks in East Africa 




Cyranoski, David. 7 Feburary 2020. Did pangolins spread the China coronavirus to people?  
Nature.  
 
Dahir, Abdi Latif. “These Are the Countries Not Signed to China’s Belt and Road Project.” Quartz 
Africa, September 30, 2019. https://qz.com/africa/1718826/the-african-countries-not-
signed-to-chinas-belt-and-road-plan/.  
 
Dollar, David. “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Infrastructure Projects in Africa.” The 
Brookings Institution, September 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/FP_20190930_china_bri_dollar.pdf.  
 
Esmail, Nafeesa, Lauren Harrington, Jack Lam, Kelly Malsch, E.J. Milner-Gulland, Zara Bending, 
Michael t’ Sas Rolfes, and Carole White. “Horizon Scanning for Illegal Wildlife Trade: A 
Strategic Approach to Inform Future CITES Policy Decisions.” Policy Briefing. Oxford 
Martin Programme on the Illegal Wildlife Trade, August 16, 2019. 
https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/publications/cites-briefing-2019/. 
 
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “Wildlife and Drug Trafficking, Terrorism, and Human Security.” The 
Brookings Institution, November 8, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/wildlife-
and-drug-trafficking-terrorism-and-human-security/. 
 
Felbab-Brown, Vanda, and Bradley S. Porter. “The Global Poaching Vortex.” The Brookings 
Institution, March 2, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2016/03/02/the-global-poaching-vortex/.  
 
Guynup, Sharon. “Pangolins On the Brink as Africa-China Trafficking Persists Unabated.” 
Mongabay, May 8, 2018. https://news.mongabay.com/2018/05/pangolins-on-the-brink-as-
africa-china-trafficking-persists-unabated/.  
 
Heinrich, Sarah, Talia Wittman, Joshua Ross, Chris Shepherd, Daniel Challender, and Phillip 
Cassey. “The Global Trafficking of Pangolins: A Comprehensive Summary of Seizures 





Ingram, D.J., Shirley, M.H., Pietersen, D., Godwill Ichu, I., Sodeinde, O., Moumbolou, C., 
Hoffmann, M., Gudehus, M. & Challender, D. 2019. Phataginus tetradactyla. The IUCN 
Red List of Threatened Species 2019: 
e.T12766A123586126. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12766A123586126.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins 
text page 129. 
 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature SSC Pangolin Specialist Group. “The Status, 
Trade and Conservation of Pangolins (Manis Spp.).” Information Document for the 17th 
Meeting of the Conference of Parties to CITES. Johannesburg, South Africa, 2016. 
 
INTERPOL. “Global Wildlife Enforcement: Strengthening Law Enforcement Cooperation 
Against Wildlife Crime.” INTERPOL, March 2019. 
 
Lam, Tommy Tsan-Yuk, Na Jia, Ya-Wei Zhang, Marcus Ho-Hin Shum, Jia-Fu Jiang, Hua-Chen  
Zhu, Yi-Gang Tong, et al. “Identifying SARS-CoV-2-Related Coronaviruses in Malayan 
Pangolins.” Nature, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41566-020-2169-0. 
 
Lau, Susanna, Hayes Luk, Antonio Wang, Kenneth Li, Longchao Zhu, Zirong He, Joshua Fung, 
Tony Chan, Kitty Fung, and Patrick Woo. Emerging Infectious Diseases 26, no. 7 (July 
2020). https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/7/20-0092_article. 
 
Lo, T. Wing, Dana Siegel, and Sharon I. Kwok (editors). Organized Crime and Corruption Across 
Borders: Exploring the Belt and Road Initiative. New York, NY: Routledge, 2020. 
 
MacDonald, James. “The Pangolin Extinction Vortex.” JSTOR Daily, March 15, 2019. 
https://daily.jstor.org/the-pangolin-extinction-vortex/.   
 
Mahmood, T., Challender, D., Khatiwada, A., Andleeb, S., Perera, P., Trageser, S., Ghose, A. & 
Mohapatra, R. 2019. Manis crassicaudata. The IUCN Red List of Threatened 
Species 2019:e.T12761A123583998. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12761A123583998.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins 
text page 76. 
 
Nantulya, Paul. “Implications for Africa from China’s One Belt One Road Strategy.” Africa Center 
for Strategic Studies, March 22, 2019. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/implications-for-
africa-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy/.  
 
Nellemann, C., R Henricksen, A. Kreilhuber, D. Stewart, M. Kotsovou, P. Raxter, E. Mrema, and 
S. Barrat. “The Rise of Environmental Crime - A Growing Threat to Natural Resources, 







Nixon, S., Pietersen, D., Challender, D., Hoffmann, M., Godwill Ichu, I., Bruce, T., Ingram, D.J., 
Matthews, N. & Shirley, M.H. 2019. Smutsia gigantea. The IUCN Red List of Threatened 
Species 2019: e.T12762A123584478. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12762A123584478.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins 
text page 162. 
 
No Author. “No More Medicine! Pangolin “Delisted” From Pharmacopoeia (translated to 
English). Health Times, 9 June 2020. 
http://www.jksb.com.cn/html/xinwen/2020/0609/163148.html. 
 
No Author. “The Belt and Road.” Belt and Road Portal, n.d.  
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ztindex.htm. 
 
No Author. “Vietnam Strengthens Law Enforcement Efforts to Protect Wildlife. WildAid.  
https://wildaid.org/vietnampenalcode/. 
 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Wildlife Poaching Threatens Economic, Security 
Priorities in Africa.” ODNI, September 6, 2013. 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Wildlife_Poaching_White_Paper_2013.pdf. 
 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 
the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape.” OECD Business and Finance 




Pietersen, D., Jansen, R. & Connelly, E. 2019. Smutsia temminckii. The IUCN Red List of 
Threatened Species 2019: e.T12765A123585768.  
https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-3.RLTS.T12765A123585768.en. Downloaded 
on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins text page 181. 
 
Pietersen, D., Moumbolou, C., Ingram, D.J., Soewu, D., Jansen, R., Sodeinde, O., Keboy Mov 
Linkey Iflankoy, C., Challender, D. & Shirley, M.H. 2019. Phataginus tricuspis. The 
IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2019: 
e.T12767A123586469. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T12767A123586469.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins 
text page 146. 
 
Prinsloo, Hendelene. “Scaling Up: The Rapid Growth in the Industrial Scale Trafficking of 








Schoppe, S., Katsis, L. & Lagrada, L. 2019. Manis culionensis. The IUCN Red List of Threatened 
Species 2019: e.T136497A123586862. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2019-
3.RLTS.T136497A123586862.en. Downloaded on 13 May 2020. Image from Pangolins 
text page 114. 
 
Shinn, David H., and Joshua Eisenman. China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 
 
Southerland, Dan. “Record Pangolin Seizures in Asia Highlight Risk to Obscure Creature.” Radio 
Free Asia, April 19, 2019. https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/pangolin-
trafficking-04192019151944.html.  
 




State Forestry and Grassland Bureau Government Network. “List of National Key Protected Wild 
Animals” 
(translated to English). Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture of the People’s Republic of 
China, 14 January 1989. http://www.forestry.gov.cn/main/3954/20180104/1063883.html. 
 
Stiles, Daniel. “Ivory Trade, Terrorism and U.S. National Security: How Connected Are They?,” 
2014. http://danstiles.org/publications/ivory/42.Ivory&National%20Security.pdf. 
 
The Green Belt and Road Initiative Center. “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).” n.d. 
https://green-bri.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri. 
 
The People’s Republic of China. “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of  





Top China Travel – What is OBOR page. “One Belt One Road Initiative.” Top China Travel, n.d. 
https://www.topchinatravel.com/silk-road/one-belt-one-road.htm.  
 
TRAFFIC. “China Moves to Give Full Protection to Native Pangolins.” Press Release. Wildlife 
Trade News from TRAFFIC, June 5, 2020. https://www.traffic.org/news/china-moves-to-
give-full-protection-to-native-pangolins/. 
 





United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Wildlife Crime: Pangolin Scales.” United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/wildlife.html.  
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “World Wildlife Crime Report: Trafficking in 
Protected Species.” Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016. 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/wildlife.html.  
 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service International Affairs. “Pangolins.” United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service, International Affairs, n.d. 
https://www.fws.gov/international/animals/pangolins.html.  
 
Utermohlen, Mary, and Patrick Baine. “In Plane Sight: Wildlife Trafficking in the Air Transport 
Sector.” ROUTES, 
2018. https://www.traffic.org/publications/reports/in-plane-sight/.  
 
Willcox, Daniel, Helen Nash, Scott Trageser, Hyeon Jeong Kim, Lisa Hywood, Ellen Connelly, 
Godwill Ichu Ichu, et al. “Evaluating Methods for Detecting and Monitoring Pangolin 
(Pholidota: Manidae) Populations.” Global Ecology and Conservation 17 (January 20, 
2019): 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gecco.2019.e00539.  
 
Wing, Lo T., Siegel, Dina, and Sharon I. Kwok. Organized Crime and Corruption Across Borders:  
Exploring the Belt and Road Initiative. Lo, T. Wing, Dana Siegel, and Sharon I. Kwok 
(editors). New York, NY: Routledge, 2020. 
 
World Wildlife Fund. “Species: Pangolin.” World Wildlife Fund, n.d.  
https://www.worldwildlife.org/species/pangolin. 
 
Xi, Jinping. “Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road.” Speech presented at the The Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation, Beijing, China, May 14, 2017. 
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qwyw/rdxw/13297.htm.  
 
Zhang, Tao, Qunfu Wu, and Zhigang Zhang. “Probable Pangolin Origin of SARS-CoV-2 




Chapter Two: BRI and Pangolin Demand 
 
Alberts, Elizabeth. “Did China Really Ban the Pangolin Trade? Not Quite, Investigators Say.” 





Bale, Rachael. “Pangolin Scale Medicines No Longer Covered by Chinese Insurance.” National 




Calado, Diogo. “Traditional Chinese Medicine as a Bridge to BRI.” China Daily, August 13, 2018.  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/13/WS5b70ea94a310add14f385632.html.  
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): 
Surveillance and Reporting.” January 8, 2004. 
https://www.cdc.gov/sars/surveillance/index.html. 
 
Chen X., Xue S., Lv M., Wang R. (2019) Pharmaceutical Industry in China: Policy, Market 
and IP. In: Liu KC., Racherla U. (eds) Innovation, Economic Development, and 
Intellectual Property in India and China. ARCIALA Series on Intellectual Assets and 
Law in Asia. Springer, Singapore. https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/10.1007/978-
981-13-8102-7_10.  
 
Chung, Vincent C.H., Polly H.X. Ma, Chun Hong Lau, Samuel Y.S. Wong, Eng Kiong Yeoh, and 
Sian M. Griffiths. “Views on Traditional Chinese Medicine Amongst Chinese Population: 
A Systematic Review of Qualitative and Quantitative Studies.” Health Expectations 17, 
no. 5 (May 31, 2012). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.13697625.2012.00794.x.  
 




Denyer, Simon. “China’s Push to Export Traditional Medicine May Doom the Magical Pangolin.” 





Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “Fentanyl and Geopolitics: Controlling Opioid Supply from China.” The 
Brookings Institution, July 22, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/research/fentanyl-and-
geopolitics-controlling-opioid-supply-from-china/.  
 
GlobeScan and World Wildlife Fund. “Opinion Survey on COVID-19 and Wildlife Trade in 5 
Asian Markets.” April 6, 2020. https://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/opinion-
survey-on-covid-19-and-wildlife-trade-in-five-asian-markets. 
 
Hooson, Jacob, Tang Zhihao, and Shan Juan. “TCM Touted for Big Role Internationally.” China 




Hornor, Faith, and Amanda Shaver. “Beyond the Scales: Pangolin Meat Trade in Asia.” C4ADS 
Blog (blog), February 26, 2020. https://c4ads.org/blogposts/pangolin-trade-in-asia.  
 
IUCN SSC Antelope Specialist Group. 2018. Saiga tatarica. The IUCN Red List of Threatened 
Species 2018: e.T19832A50194357. https://dx.doi.org/10.2305/IUCN.UK.2018-
2.RLTS.T19832A50194357.en. Downloaded on 27 June 2020. 
 
Larmer, Brook. “China’s Mixed Messages on the Global Trade in Endangered Animal Parts.” The  




Liu, Zhao, Zhigang Jiang, Hongxia Fang, Chunwang Li, Aizi Mi, Jing Chen, Xiaowei Zhang, et 
al. “Perception, Price and Preference: Consumption and Protection of Wild Animals Used 
in Traditional Medicine.” PLOS ONE 11, no. 3 (March 1, 2016): 1–19. 
https://doi.org/DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0145901.  
 
Lu, Winston and Dominic Lu. “Impact of Chinese Herbal Medicine on American Society and 
Health Care System: Perspective and Concern.” Hindawi, 2014. 
https://www.hindawi.com/journals/ecam/2014/251891/. 
 
MacDonald, James. “The Pangolin Extinction Vortex.” JSTOR Daily, March 15, 2019.  
https://daily.jstor.org/the-pangolin-extinction-vortex/.  
 
Mainka, Susan, and Judy Mills. “Wildlife and Traditional Chinese Medicine: Supply and Demand 
for Wildlife Species.” Journal of Zoo and Wildlife Medicine 26, no. 2 (1995): 193–200. 
 
Matsangou, Elizabeth. “The Dark Underbelly of the Traditional Chinese Medicine Boom.” World 
Finance, April 23, 2019. https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/the-dark-underbelly-of-
the-traditional-chinese-medicine-boom.  
 
McGregor, Tom. “China Adopts More Effective TCM Law.” CCTV.com, December 27, 2016. 
https://english.cctv.com/2016/12/27/ARTIudJzIZG9zJ0VT7jqqwCG161227.shtml.  
 
No Author. “China’s TCM Industry Grows 20%.” Xinhua News Agency, November 24, 2017.  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-11/24/content_34927828.htm. 
 
No Author. “Chinese Medicine.” Hopkins Medicine, n.d.  
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/wellness-and-prevention/chinese-medicine. 
 
Nuwer, Rachel. “Illegal Trade in Pangolins Keeps Growing as Criminal Networks Expand.” 






Perper, Rosie. “China is Injecting Millions into WHO as the US Cuts Funds. Experts Say Beijing  
is Trying to Boost its Influence Over the Agency and Its ‘Deeply Compromised’ Chief.” 




PLOS. "Bat Cave Study Sheds New Light on Origin of SARS Virus: Newly Discovered SARS  
Strains in Bats Hold Genetic Clues to the Evolution of a Human Pandemic Strain." 
ScienceDaily, 30 November 2017. 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/11/171130141222.htm. 
 
Prinsloo, Hendelene. “Scaling Up: The Rapid Growth in the Industrial Scale Trafficking of  




Su, Alice. “It’s a Mammal. It Looks Like an Artichoke. And China Is Driving It Toward  




United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Wildlife Crime: Pangolin Scales.” United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/wildlife.html.  
 
United States Agency for International Development. “Research Study on Consumer Demand for 




van Uhm, Daan. Organized Crime and Corruption Across Borders: Exploring the Belt and Road  
Initiative. Lo, T. Wing, Dana Siegel, and Sharon I. Kwok (editors). New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2020. 
 
Wang, L.F. and B.T. Eaton. “Bats, Civets, and the Emergence of SARS.” PubMed, 2007.  
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17848070/. 
 
World Health Organization. “ICD-11 for Mortality and Morbidity.” World Health Organization.  
June 18, 2018. https://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/. 
 
World Health Organization. “WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard. Last updated  






World Health Organization. “World Health Assembly.” World Health Organization. n.d.  
https://www.who.int/about/governance/world-health-assembly.  
 
World Wildlife Fund. “Species: Tiger.” World Wildlife Fund, n.d. 
https://www.worldwildlife.org/species/tiger. 
 
Zhang, Sunny, Alec Wall, and Matthew Sima. “Can a Synthetic Substitute Save the Pangolin?”  
New Security Beat. September 19, 2019. 
https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2019/09/synthetic-substitute-save-pangolin/.  
 
Zhou, Viola. “Beijing City Plans to Punish People for ‘Defaming’ Traditional Chinese Medicine.” 
South ChinaMorning Post, June 4, 2020. 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3087545/beijing-city-plans-punish-
people-defaming-traditional-chinese.   
 
 
Chapter Three: The Pangolin Trafficking Supply Chain 
 
Belt and Road News Current Affairs Correspondent Africa. “Is Chinese Investment a Threat to 
Nigeria?” Belt and Road News, August 12, 2019. 
https://www.beltandroad.news/2019/08/12/is-chinese-investment-a-threat-to-nigeria/.  
 
Challender, Daniel W.S., Baillie, Jonathan E. M., Waterman, Carly, Pietersen, Darren W., Nash,  
Helen, Leanne Wicker, Keri Parker, et al. “On Scaling Up Pangolin Conservation.” 




Challender, Daniel W.S. and Carly Waterman. “Implementation of CITES Decisions 17.239 b)  
and 17.240 on Pangolins (Manis spp.).” IUCN and CITES, September 2017. 
https://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/69/E-SC69-57-A.pdf. 
 
Cheng, Wenda, Shuang Xing, and Timothy C. Bonebrake. “Recent Pangolin Seizures in China 
Reveal Priority  Areas for Intervention.” Conservation Letters 10, no. 6 (2017): 757–64. 
https://doi.org/10.111/conl.12339.  
 
Christy, Bryan. “How Killing Elephants Finances Terror in Africa.” National Geographic, August  
12, 2015. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/tracking-ivory/article.html. 
 
CIA. “Africa: Nigeria.” The CIA World Factbook. June 17, 2020.  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html. 
 
CITES. “Countries Currently Subject to a Recommendation to Suspend Trade.” CITES. December  
19, 2019. https://cites.org/eng/resources/ref/suspend.php. 
 
CITES. “Nigeria.” n.d. https://cites.org/eng/cms/index.php/component/cp/country/NG. 
 94 
Denyer, Simon. “Chinese Officials Accused of Smuggling Ivory During State Visit to Tanzania.”  





Felbab-Brown, Vanda, and Bradley S. Porter. “The Global Poaching Vortex.” The Brookings 
Institution, March 2, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2016/03/02/the-global-poaching-vortex/. 
 
Gupta, Alok. “Illegal Pangolin Scale Seizure Crosses $100 Million Mark.” CGTN, April 11, 2019. 
https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d774e3355544f33457a6333566d54/index.html.  
 
Guynup, Sharon. “Pangolins On the Brink as Africa-China Trafficking Persists Unabated.” 
Mongabay, May 8, 2018. https://news.mongabay.com/2018/05/pangolins-on-the-brink-as-
africa-china-trafficking-persists-unabated/. 
 
Heinrich, Sarah, Talia Wittman, Joshua Ross, Chris Shepherd, Daniel Challender, and Phillip 
Cassey. “The Global Trafficking of Pangolins: A Comprehensive Summary of Seizures 
and Trafficking Routes from 2010 - 2015.” Selangor, Malaysia: TRAFFIC, 2017. 
https://www.traffic.org/publications/reports/the-global-trafficking-of-pangolins/.  
 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature SSC Pangolin Specialist Group. “The Status, 
Trade and Conservation of Pangolins (Manis Spp.).” Information Document for the 17th 
Meeting of the Conference of Parties to CITES. Johannesburg, South Africa, 2016. 
 
Jiaming, Xu, Elroi Yee, and Karen Zhang. “Nigeria: Global Investigation - Pangolins: Trafficked 
to Extinction.” Premium Times Nigeria, September 25, 2019. 
https://allafrica.com/stories/201909250322.html.  
 
Kaiman, Jonathan. “China-Africa Relations Hurt by Bad Chinese Behaviour, Says Ambassador.”  
The Guardian, July 17, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/17/chinese-
ambassador-tanzania-china-africa-relationship-ivory-smuggling-counterfeit. 
 
Krishnasamy, Kanitha, and Monica Zavagli. “Southeast Asia: At the Heart of Wildlife Trade.” 




Lopez, Alessandra L., Ji, Chen, Yang, Emma, Choe, Incheol, Delaney, Nora and Rocky Intan.  
“China’s BRI in Nigeria: Spillover Effects of Lagos-Ibadan Railway to the Regional 












Omondi Gumba, Duncan E., and Richard Chelin. “China Is Proving Key to Reducing Africa’s 




Prinsloo, Hendelene. “Scaling Up: The Rapid Growth in the Industrial Scale Trafficking of 




Quinn, Dennis. “Nigerians Living Near a Major Belt and Road Project Grew More Positive  




Reynolds, Matt. “The War Against Animal Poaching Will Be Won by Data, Not Drones.” WIRED,  
February 14, 2018. https://www.wired.co.uk/article/elephant-rhino-wildlife-poaching-
smart-wildlife-conservation-society.  
 
Roth, Annie. “Poachers kill more rhinos as coronavirus halts tourism to Africa.” The New York  
Times, April 8, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/science/coronavirus-
poaching-rhinos.html.  
 
Shinn, David H., and Joshua Eisenman. China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 
 
Southerland, Dan. “Record Pangolin Seizures in Asia Highlight Risk to Obscure Creature.” Radio  
Free Asia, April 19, 2019. https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/pangolin-
trafficking-04192019151944.html.  
 
Thebault, Reis. “The World’s Most-Trafficked Mammal May Also Be Its Most Obscure -- and  




The Green Belt and Road Initiative Center. “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).” n.d.  
https://green-bri.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri. 
 








United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Is Nigeria Evolving into a Transit Hub for Wildlife  
Trafficking?” March 3, 2019. https://www.unodc.org/nigeria/en/is-nigeria-evolving-into-
a-transit-hub-for-wildlife-trafficking.html. 
 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Wildlife Crime: Pangolin Scales.” United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/wildlife.html.  
 
United States Agency for International Development. “Research Study on Consumer Demand for 




Utermohlen, Mary, and Patrick Baine. “In Plane Sight: Wildlife Trafficking in the Air Transport 
Sector.” ROUTES, 2018. https://www.traffic.org/publications/reports/in-plane-sight/. 
 
Wasser, S.K., L. Brown, C. Mailand, S. Mondol, W. Clark, C. Laurie, and B.S. Weir. “Genetic 
Assignment of Large Seizures of Elephant Ivory Reveals Africa’s Major Poaching 
Hotspots.” Science 349, no. 6243 (July 3, 2015): 84-87. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa2457.  
 
Wildlife Justice Commission. “FAQs.” n.d. https://wildlifejustice.org/faq/.  
 
Wildlife Justice Commission. “Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Wildlife 
Trafficking.” Wildlife Justice Commission, April 2020. https://wildlifejustice.org/new-
analysis-measures-to-combat-covid-19-impact-wildlife-trafficking/ 
 
World Wildlife Fund. “China Joins African Countries in Efforts to Curb Wildlife Trafficking,” 




Wrate, Jonny. “Uganda: Chinese Diplomats Face Ivory Trafficking Investigation.” Organized 




Zhang, Karen. “New Pangolin Laws Bite as Mainland Chinese Man Sentenced to 20 Months for 
Trafficking 48kg of Scales in Landmark Hong Kong Endangered Species Case.” South 




Chapter Four: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
Coons, Chris, Lindsey Graham, and Carter Roberts. “How to Stop the Next Pandemic.” Politico, 
May 15, 2020. https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2020/05/15/how-to-stop-the-next-
pandemic-260946.  
 




Royce, Edward R. [R-CA-39] (sponsor). Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking 
Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. Public Law No: 114-231, H.R.2494 (2016). 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2494.  
 
Shinn, David H., and Joshua Eisenman. China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. Philadelphia, 
PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 
 
The Green Belt and Road Initiative Center. “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).” n.d.  
https://green-bri.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri. 
 
Xinhua Silk Road Information Service. “Belt and Road FAQ: What are the Belt and Road  
Countries?” June 23, 2020. https://en.imsilkroad.com/p/314398.html. 
 
